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NECESSARY SUFFERING?: WEIGHING GOVERNMENT AND
PRISONER INTERESTS IN DETERMINING
WHAT IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
Brittany Glidden*
It is said that no one truly knows a nation until one has been inside its jails. A
nation should not be judged by how it treats its highest citizens, but its lowest
ones ....
- Nelson Mandela'
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a man is held in solitary confinement for thirty years. For three
decades he eats every meal alone in his cell, "exercises" by himself in a cage
outside, and is only touched when handcuffs are placed on him. As a result of the
prolonged isolation he suffers mental anguish and develops severe depression.
Should this treatment be deemed constitutionally acceptable? Does it matter if the
prisoner was placed there because he killed a prison guard? What if he was
subjected to this treatment at random?
The Eighth Amendment forbids the Government from inflicting "cruel and
unusual punishments" on any individual convicted of a crime.2 The Supreme
Court has interpreted this language to provide a means for prisoners to challenge
their conditions of confinement while in custody,3 including the adequacy of their
food or the temperature of their cells.4 To challenge a prison condition under the
Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must demonstrate (1) that the challenged condition
he' faces is "sufficiently serious," and (2) that prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference to the condition.6 These requirements are known as the objective
prong (i.e. whether the condition is "bad" enough to merit protection) and the
subjective prong (i.e. whether the prison officials had a mindset that was inappro-
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank the many
people who gave me invaluable insights, feedback, and assistance in writing this paper, including Laura Rovner,
Tammy Kuennen, Alan Chen, Sara Norman, Lindsey Webb, Kevin Lynch, Eric Frankin, Peggy Collins, Blake
Glidden, and Dave Rolnitzky. @ 2013, Brittany Glidden.
1. NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 174-75 (1994).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
3. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
4. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (listing basic human needs that could give rise to Eighth
Amendment liability).
5. As more than 90% of prisoners in the United States are male, I use the masculine pronoun to refer to the
average "prisoner" throughout the article. See HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, PRISONERS IN 2009,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIsTIcs 2 (Dec. 2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf (finding males
account for 93% of all prisoners).
6. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
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priate).
The current two-part conditions test is largely uncontroversial. The test is
universally accepted and cited by the all courts addressing Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement claims.8 Perhaps for this reason it has received limited
criticism from courts and commentators,9 especially when compared to the
scholarly attention given to other areas of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, such
as criminal sentencing. o Although the lack of controversy could be an indication
that the test is working effectively, in this article I maintain the reverse is true.
Namely, the Eight Amendment conditions of confinement test is confusing,
inconsistent, and ultimately lacks a sound theoretical basis, which prevents it from
serving its intended purpose. I argue that-as in nearly all other Eighth Amend-
ment claims-assessment of the validity of a prison condition should be reviewed
for "excessiveness," meaning the condition should be considered in light of its
asserted purpose. Further, I urge that in cases seeking injunctive relief, where a
harm or risk is ongoing, courts should presume that the prison officials have a
culpable mindset that satisfies the second prong of the test.
Without a coherent test or secure theoretical footholds, judges struggle with a
basic question: whether the Eighth Amendment serves to protect prisoners from
any inhumane conditions or only prohibits conditions resulting from a prison
official's demonstrable bad intent. Jurists, like most of society, wish to intervene
when they see deplorable conditions regardless of what is causing them. However,
they also respect the difficult work of prison officials and hesitate to hold them
liable when the officials' were seemingly well intentioned or simply made a
7. Id.; see also Smith v. Cochran, 339 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378,
402 (6th Cit. 1999).
8. While excessive force cases-which also challenge prison conditions or treatment-use this two-prong test,
the mindset requirement is heightened. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175 (2010).
9. Very few scholars have examined and critiqued the Eighth Amendment conditions doctrine. See Sharon
Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 881 (2009); Alexander A.
Reinert, Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation Benefit from Proportionality
Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53 (2009). By contrast, there are many student notes and case comments about
the Eighth Amendment decisions in this area. See, e.g., Michael J. O'Connor, Comment, What Would Darwin
Say?: The Mis-Evolution of the Eighth Amendment, 78 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1389 (2003); Pamela M. Rosenblatt,
Note, The Dilemma of Overcrowding in the Nation's Prisons: What Are Constitutional Conditions and What Can
Be Done?, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 489 (1991) (reviewing possible Eighth Amendment challenges to
overcrowding); Doretha M. Van Slyke, Note, Hudson v. McMillian and Prisoners'Rights: The Court Giveth and
the Court Taketh Away, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1727 (1993).
10. This point is generally illustrated by a Westlaw search. A search of journals and law reviews for articles
with the terms "eighth amendment" and "sentences or sentencing" yields nearly 9,000 results, while a search for
"eighth amendment" and "prison conditions' or 'conditions of confinement"' only yields 2,150 results. See, e.g.,
Mary Berkheiser, Death is Not so Different After All: Graham v. Florida and the Court's "Kids are Different"
Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 36 VT. L. Rev. 1 (2011); John F Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REv. 899 (2011); William W. Berry 1l, Response,
Separating Retribution From Proportionality: A Response to Stinneford, 97 VA. L. REv. IN BRIEF 61 (2011);
Michael M. O'Hear, Mandatory Minimums: Don't Give Up on the Court, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOvo 67
(2011), www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/OHEAR_2011_67.pdf.
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mistake.
The impact of this struggle is apparent in each prong of the Eighth Amendment
conditions test. The "objective" prong purports to measure the "seriousness" of
the challenged condition, but close scrutiny of court decisions reveals that there is
no organized methodology to determine what makes a condition "sufficiently"
serious. When a prisoner raises a novel challenge to a condition, jurists have no
means to assess the seriousness of the condition apart from their innate sense of
what is acceptable.
Without consistent criteria for determining what constitutes a sufficiently
serious condition, judges often factor a prison official's motivations into this
"objective" analysis in an attempt to hold accountable only those with inappropri-
ate reasons for their actions. It is normal for judges or juries to want know the
reason for a condition in order to assess its seriousness. For example, juries
recognize that a prisoner placed into solitary confinement for two years for a
violent incident is inherently different from a person placed there for no reason at
all. Yet, the Supreme Court has never clarified whether a subjective assessment of a
prison official's motivations belongs in first prong, the second prong, or has no
place in the analysis.
Lower courts disagree about the role intent should play in Eighth Amend-
ment analyses. While lower courts have traditionally viewed intent as part of the
subjective prong, some regularly incorporate intent analyses into the objective
prong. As a result, the test fails to provide sufficient guidance to a court faced with
any novel challenge to a prison condition. Without guidance, courts do as they
often do in prison case: they defer to the assessments of prison officials. Yet, by
deferring, courts ignore the protection provided by the Eighth Amendment. While
the Amendment is intended as a check against excessive state action, those same
state actors are defining its limits. Put another way, by deferring to the judgment of
correctional officers, courts have effectively turned the objective prong on its head:
it now hinges on the subjective motivations of the people it is intended to monitor.
The test also requires prison officials to have a subjective mindset of "deliberate
indifference." Determining an individual's intent is difficult in any context, but the
prison setting is especially challenging because it often implicates the practices
and policies of the entire correctional system. In many cases, neither the policy's
initial enactment nor the actions of the prison staff required to follow the policy
resulted from a specific intent to harm prisoners, which makes the intent analysis
very challenging for jurists.
When a harmful condition is ongoing, many courts also seem to infer intent on
the part of prison defendants since the officials are willing to allow the conditions
to persist. I argue that this inference should be made explicit in all injunctive cases.
When harmful conditions are allowed to continue, there is culpability even without
proof of mindset. Inferring intent in injunctive cases is more efficient and allows
the courts to interfere in ongoing conditions cases where society has a strong
interest.
2012] 1817
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Part I of this Article gives background on the origins of the Eighth Amendment
doctrine concerning prison conditions and identifies persistent conflicts regarding
the theoretical underpinnings for the doctrine. This history then provides context
for Part II's description of the problems plaguing the current two-prong Eighth
Amendment test. Part III includes a brief examination of the theoretical basis
underlying other areas of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, including those
challenging criminal sentences, fines, and method of execution cases. This review
demonstrates that nearly all of these doctrines rely on a determination of the
"excessiveness" of a given punishment, a proportionality analysis that is absent
from conditions cases. Part III considers whether proportionality review can be
imported into the context of challenges to prison conditions, and the benefits and
drawbacks of doing so.
Part IV discusses how the two-prong test should be modified to address these
concerns. First, I argue that the current "objective" test should include a balancing
test reviewing the "excessiveness" of a given condition. This analysis would
expressly permit courts to consider the prison condition in light of the purpose for
which it is employed. Second, I urge courts to infer intent in injunctive cases under
the "subjective" prong. This inference will promote efficiency and will ensure that
ongoing harmful conditions are stopped.
This modified version of the two-prong test would maintain the two foci of
current Eighth Amendment conditions law-the significance of the harm of the
challenged condition and the intent of the prison official in creating or prolonging
it. Yet the modifications would also allow a framework that more cleanly aligns
with the societal means of identifying what is cruel, and the societal interest in
ensuring that our prisons do not perpetuate harmful conditions of confinement.
I. ARE PRISON CONDITIONS "PUNISHMENT"?: THE DEBATE UNDERLYING THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT'S APPLICATION TO CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
To be considered punishment, a penalty or negative action must be intentionally
inflicted, usually in response to an offense." While it is axiomatic that criminal
sentences are deliberately prescribed, there is disagreement as to whether prison
conditions are imposed intentionally and therefore constitute "punishment." Un-
like sentences or fines, prison conditions are neither dictated by state statute nor
ordered by a judge.12 Usually a prisoner's conditions do not directly relate to his
11. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american-english/punishment (last
visited Jan. 7, 2013) (defining "punishment" as "the infliction or imposition of a penalty as retribution for an
offense").
12. Reinert, supra note 109, at 74-75; Dolovich, supra note 9, at 885. In the past, some conditions-such as
hard labor-were specifically imposed as part of a sentence. See generally Amy L. Riederer, Note, Working 9 to
5: Embracing the Eighth Amendment Through an Integrated Model of Prison Labor, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1425
(2009).
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crime of conviction,' 3 but result from general prison policies, such as the use
of handcuffs and restraint chairs, or from circumstances such as overcrowding or
the presence of asbestos.14 Because conditions are not always the result of
intentional conduct on the part of prison actors, courts have vacillated on the
question of whether they qualify as punishment.
Prior to the mid-1900s, there was no doctrine that permitted prisoners to
challenge their conditions of confinement. Courts adopted what was retrospec-
tively referred to as the "hands-off' doctrine, a refusal to interfere in prison
matters, because they believed it would be disruptive and would implicate
separation of powers concerns." The growth of the social services movement
during the twentieth century began to change this view.16 As the government
assumed additional responsibilities as caretaker for its citizens and the civil rights
movement took hold, a more protectionist mentality developed toward prisoners.17
Gradually prisoners began to assert their rights and courts became more receptive
to addressing the most egregious conditions and inhumane treatment.' 8
In the mid-1900s, the judiciary heard many cases involving extreme suffering
and dangerous conditions within the prisons. The courts had to determine whether
these claims were actionable under the Eighth Amendment. At that time, prison
conditions were indisputably harsh, unsanitary, and verging on anyone's definition
of inhumane.' 9 Perhaps in response to these extreme situations, lower courts in the
latter half of the twentieth century began to affirmatively deem some conditions of
confinement to be "punishment," and found many to be illegal under the Eighth
Amendment.2 0
13. Adam Kolber describes how a person's experience in prison can vary greatly based factors-including
location, funding, management, and luck-that do not result from his crime of conviction. Adam J. Kolber,
Unintentional Punishment, LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming 2013). Certain crimes, however, will dictate some
conditions of confinement. For example, a prisoner convicted of sex crimes is often placed in a "protective
custody" unit. See Michael S. James, Prison is 'Living Hell'for Pedophiles, ABC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2003),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90004#.UD53tdb8t2A.
14. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 369-70 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (raising possible reasons
for a prison condition).
15. THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 191 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995).
16. Id. at 191-92.
17. Id. During this time the Eighth Amendment was incorporated against the states, broadening its potential
application to state prisons. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
18. THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 15, at 192.
19. A thorough history of these conditions can be found in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 15,
at 170-71. The conditions in "most state prisons" at this time were "grossly deficient" in that they were
overcrowded, had rampant abuse, and inadequate management. See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352
(1981) (finding conditions in a number of prisons to be "deplorable" and "sordid").
20. See, e.g., Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding doctor's decision to throw away a
prisoner's ear and stitching the stump may be attributable to deliberate indifference); Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d
151, 158 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding actionable the injection of a prisoner with penicillin despite knowledge that
prisoner was allergic, and subsequent refusal to treat allergic reaction); Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F.2d 1192, 1193
(8th Cir. 1973) (finding actionable refusal of paramedic to provide treatment); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921,
922 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding prisoner stated a colorable claim where prison physician refused to administer a
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The Supreme Court soon followed suit. In 1976, the Court held in Estelle v.
Gamble that prison conditions could constitute punishment but did not directly
answer the question of when a condition was punishment and when it was not.2 In
Estelle, the prisoner alleged that the prison staff had not provided him with
adequate medical care for his back pain.2 2 In determining whether the actions of
medical staff qualified as punishment, the Court first held that the prison system
had an affirmative duty to provide medical treatment, stating, "An inmate must
rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so,
those needs will not be met." 2 3 The Court also held that there was no penological
interest in denying care, as "denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering
which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose .... [S]uch unneces-
sary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency ....
Despite these requirements, the Court held the prison staff's actions did not violate
the Eighth Amendment because the plaintiff could not prove the staff acted with
the required mindset of deliberate indifference.2 5
Over the next decade, the Supreme Court and lower courts grappled with what
was required to successfully challenge a prison condition under Estelle.2 6 The
debate converged on a central unanswered question: Was the purpose of the Eighth
Amendment to prevent prisoners from enduring harmful conditions, to prevent
inappropriate actions by staff members, or both?
In the face of dangerous prison conditions across the country, one set of jurists
took the position that the central inquiry of the Eighth Amendment is the harm to
the prisoner. These courts believed the Amendment was necessary to safeguard
prisoners, who had little protection from prison officials, the legislature, or the
public.2 8 They found the "touchstone" of the Eighth Amendment inquiry was the
prescribed pain killer and rendered leg surgery unsuccessful by requiring prisoner to stand despite contrary
instructions of surgeon); Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 1949) (addressing cruelty of a chain gang and
finding it violated the Eighth Amendment).
21. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
22. Id. at 97.
23. Id. at 103.
24. Id. at 103--04. While lower courts had already used the Eighth Amendment as a limitation on harmful
conditions of confinement, this type of litigation "mushroomed" after Estelle. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318,
328 (M.D. Ala. 1976). In 1981, there were twenty-four states with system-wide consent decrees in place, resulting
from findings that the conditions therein violated the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 353
(1981).
25. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107-08.
26. In hindsight Estelle was the easy case. Failure to provide medical care places a prisoner at severe risk,
potentially death, and the prison rarely, if ever, can allege a legitimate reason for not providing medical care to one
of its wards. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
27. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 364 (finding when the "impact of the conditions of incarceration threatens the
physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of the inmates . .. the court must conclude that the
conditions violate the Constitution") (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. These judges believed prison inmates to be "voteless, politically unpopular, and socially threatening" and
that their suffering "moves the community in only the most severe and exceptional cases." Id. at 358 (citing
Morris, The Snail's Pace of Prison Reform, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 100rH ANNuAL CONGRESS OF CORR. OF THE
1820 [Vol. 49:1815
NECESSARY SUFFERING
"effect upon the imprisoned." 29 This position did not examine the mindset or intent
of the officers but concluded "federal courts are required by the Constitution to
play a role" when "conditions are deplorable and the political process offers no
redress."3 o Some degree of distrust of prison officials and a belief that courts have
a role in the protection of prisoners were inherent to this view.3 1
However, other judges maintained that the main Eighth Amendment inquiry was
not the effect of a condition on the prisoners, but the intent of the prison official.32
Under the terms of the Amendment, conditions only became "punishment" when
prison officials or the legislature intended them to be punishment.33 This position
was deferential to prison staff because it presumed that officers were trying
diligently to perform difficult duties.34 Accordingly, these courts would only find
liability when prison officials exhibit wantonness, not when harm resulted from
unintended consequences. Espousing a stronger version of this position, Justice
Scalia has urged that a condition should be actionable only when prison staff acts
with a heighted mental state, such as malicious or sadistic intent.
Debate between these two opposing positions has persisted for the past thirty-
five years. Consequently, the current Eighth Amendment test requires both
components to be actionable: (1) a prisoner must make an objective showing that a
condition causes harm (or risk of harm), and (2) prison officials must have acted
with a culpable mental state.3 These two requirements are now known as the
objective and subjective prongs of the Eighth Amendment conditions test. Al-
though adopting both prongs did address concerns raised by both viewpoints, they
have also created new problems in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
AM. CORR. Ass'N 36, 42 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, legislatures often refused "to
spend sufficient tax dollars to bring conditions in outdated prisons up to minimally acceptable standards."
Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648, 654 (D. Md. 1978).
29. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 366 (Brennan, J, concurring in the judgment); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
309 (1991) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
30. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 377 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "[W]e [should] examine only the objective severity, not
the subjective intent of government officials." Wilson, 501 U.S. at 309 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
31. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
32. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303.
33. See generally id. at 301-02 ("An intent requirement is either implicit in the word 'punishment' or is not; it
cannot be alternately required and ignored as policy considerations might dictate.").
34. One clear example of this belief was in Rhodes, where the majority believed that the prison officials
were doing the best they could and were only suffering the impact of "an unanticipated increase in the State's
prison population compelling the double ceiling that is at issue." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 351 n.16. Under these
circumstances, the Court urged deference to the officials, stating courts cannot assume that state legislatures and
prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems
of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system. Id. at 352.
35. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
36. See id. at 320-21; see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 299. Justice Thomas takes this approach even further, and
argues that a condition is only punishment when it is specifically applied as part of the sentence. Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 37-42 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
37. See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (laying out the basics of the two-prong test).
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II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT CONDITIONS TEST: HOW THE
OBJECTIVE PRONG BECAME SUBJECTIVE AND THE SUBJECTIVE PRONG
BECAME OBJECTIVE
At first glance, the issues with the two-prong Eighth Amendment test are not
apparent. The objective prong limits the scope of the courts' ability to oversee
prisons in that it restricts reviewable conduct to that which is "sufficiently
serious. It makes sense that the Eighth Amendment does not exist to regulate all
happenings in prison, but only to prevent aversive and inhumane conditions-that
is, those that are sufficiently serious.39 Even the staunchest prison advocate would
be hard-pressed to assert that the Eighth Amendment should be used to review
conditions that do not cause pain or risk of harm. Prison, by its very nature, is
punishment and is not intended to be pleasant or comfortable.4 0
The subjective prong measures the mindset of the actors in the prison system.4 1
Courts, and largely society,42 are uncomfortable holding prison officials respon-
sible for a condition or event that was not intended.4 3 The Supreme Court
determined the Eighth Amendment is designed to hold accountable "bad" intent
displayed by officers, not to penalize those who, through accident or mistake,
cause or permit something bad to happen."" Underlying this requirement is the
belief that these officials are doing difficult work and should only be held
accountable for situations that were known and preventable. 4 5 While this two-part
test has intrinsic appeal, a closer examination of its application reveals that it is not
functioning as intended, and is creating negative consequences for both prisoners
and prison officials.
38. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
39. See, e.g., id.
40. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981) (finding that "the Constitution does not mandate
comfortable prisons, and prisons ... cannot be free of discomfort"); Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1315-15
(1981) ("[I]n short, nobody promised [inmates] a rose garden; and I know of nothing in the Eighth Amendment
which requires that they be housed in a manner most pleasing to them, or considered even by most knowledgeable
penal authorities to be likely to avoid confrontations, psychological depression, and the like."); Chandler v.
Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) ("If prison conditions are merely restrictive and even harsh, they are
part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
41. See, e.g., Farmer 511 U.S. at 834.
42. This sentiment is captured by the quote from Judge Posner, that "[if] [a] guard accidentally stepped on [a]
prisoner's toe and broke it, this would not be punishment in anything remotely like the accepted meaning of the
word." Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985).
43. Farmer 511 U.S. at 835-40 (applying mindset requirement to find liability).
44. Id. at 840-41; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S 294, 299-301 (1991); Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 652.
45. As Judge Posner has observed: "The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or
deter. This is what the word means today; it is what it meant in the eighteenth century." Duckworth, 780 F.2d
at 652.
NECESSARY SUFFERING
A. The "Objective" Prong
While the law is clear that no prisoner can recover under the Eighth Amendment
unless he can demonstrate that the harm he suffers is "sufficiently serious," 4 6
determining what meets this standard as a normative matter is complicated and
uncertain. Estelle v. Gamble was the Supreme Court's first attempt to define the
class of actionable conditions.4 7 In Estelle, the Court confirmed the Constitution
created a duty for prison staff to provide medical care for prisoners because they
could not independently meet their own needs.4 8 Although the case signaled this
duty was not exclusive, the Court was not specific regarding which conditions
triggered protection. 4 9 Since Estelle, courts have therefore identified broad catego-
ries of duties owed to prisoners, including the provision of "basic human needs"
and preventing conditions that could result in death or substantial harm.o
Lower court decisions on what constitutes "sufficiently serious" have been
largely dictated by the sentiments of the judge and the quality of the advocacy.5'
The subjectivity has created inconsistent decisions across all areas of prison life,
including living conditions, disciplinary measures, exercise requirements, and
denial of amenities.52 As a result of these inconsistent rulings, interested parties,
including prisoners, prison staff, judges, and the public, are left with significant
questions regarding what conditions are acceptable. These questions are further
complicated because of the undefined role that the penological interest underlying
a condition plays in this determination. While in theory it may seem that a
condition can be evaluated for its seriousness absent its purpose, in reality this
separation is difficult; the cruelty of a condition is innately tied to the reason it is
applied.
1. The Problem of What
The Supreme Court has relied on a variety of phrases to describe what
conditions satisfy the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment test. Actionable
conditions are those that deprive prisoners of the "minimal civilized measure
of life's necessities," are "inhumane," place prisoners at "unreasonable risk" of
46. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
47. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
48. Id. at 104 ("[It is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the
deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.").
49. Id. (finding that "the public [is] required to care for the prisoner").
50. The Eighth Amendment violation must include "the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such
as food, warmth, or exercise." Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304; see also Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir.
1998) (finding basic necessities to be adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care and taking reasonable
measures to guarantee the inmates' safety).
51. See infra notes 74-83.
52. Id.
2012] 1823
1824 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1815
"significant harm," or are the cause "of unnecessary suffering."53 From these
characterizations, one descriptor has emerged predominant: a condition must
deprive a prisoner of a "basic human need" to warrant Eighth Amendment
protection.54
Whether a prisoner is deprived of a "basic human need" is not a simple question.
While some basic needs are necessary to stay alive, such as food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, and reasonable safety,55 others would not be directly fatal if absent,
such as exercise' and outdoor access. 7 The Supreme Court has also maintained
that this list is not exhaustive, which leaves room for the recognition of additional
needs.
How the "list" of basic needs changes is a matter of debate. The Supreme Court
indicates that the list will change with "society's evolving standards of decency."59
Thus, some punishments that were acceptable in the past have been eliminated as
public opinion shifts.6 0 In the context of criminal sentencing, courts can and do
assess public opinion by examining the laws of varying jurisdictions. 6 1 Prison
conditions do not have an equivalent indicator of majority opinion. Information
about prison conditions is notoriously hidden from public view and there is no easy
way for judges to compare various practices.6 2 Additionally, even when this
53. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 29-31 (1993) ("unreasonable risk"); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303
("inhumane"); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) ("minimal civilized measure of life's necessities");
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) ("unnecessary suffering").
54. See, e.g., Lockamy v. Rodriguez, 402 F App'x 950,951 (5th Cir. 2010); Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d
315, 338 (3d Cir. 2010); Mufiiz v. Richardson, 371 F. App'x 905, 908 (10th Cir. 2010).
55. Helling, 509 U.S. at 32 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200
(1989)).
56. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304.
57. See Bailey v. Shillinger, 828 F.2d 651, 653 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding there to be "substantial agreement
among the cases" that some form of regular outdoor exercise is required under the Eighth Amendment); see also
Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1152 (5th Cir. 1982); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979).
58. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments "draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (finding that definition of cruel and unusual
punishment is contextual and responsive to "contemporary standards of decency").
59. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101).
60. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (prohibiting life without parole for non-homicide
crimes committed by minors); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting death penalty for mentally
retarded offenders); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (prohibiting death penalty minors under
sixteen); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (prohibiting death penalty for felony murder); Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584 (1977) (prohibiting death penalty for rape).
61. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024 (reviewing state laws and practices for imposition of sentence of life
without parole for non-homicide crimes committed by juvenile offenders).
62. Justice Kennedy spoke on this issue at an American Bar Association ("ABA") meeting in 2003. See Justice
Anthony Kennedy, Speech at ABA Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003) ("The subject of prisons and corrections may
tempt some of you to tune out . . .. Even those of us who have specific professional responsibilities for the
criminal justice system can be neglectful when it comes to the subject of corrections. The focus of the legal
profession, perhaps even the obsessive focus, has been on the process for determining guilt or innocence. When
someone has been judged guilty and the appellate and collateral review process has ended, the legal profession
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information is available, regular use of a practice does not indicate its acceptance
by society." Thus, judges currently have no clear or universal means to assess
"evolving standards of decency" in the context of basic human needs.
The problem is best illustrated by a hypothetical. A prisoner, Mr. Jones, has been
held in solitary confinement for thirty years.6 He has had almost no contact with
other prisoners and believes that these isolating conditions have harmed him by
causing depression, inability to sleep, inability to concentrate, and mental anguish.
Based on these conditions, Mr. Jones filed a lawsuit alleging that his conditions of
confinement violate the Eighth Amendment.
How does a well-meaning judge analyze this situation? Is human contact a
human need? Does this need include touching other people? How does the length
of the isolation impact this decision? There is no clear indicator of public opinion
regarding solitary confinement. On one hand, solitary confinement is a common
prison practice6 5 and on the other, there is increased criticism of its long-term
use.6 6 The case has experts on both sides, both arguing that human contact is, or is
not, necessary for the human experience. Does it matter whether Mr. Jones can
seems to lose all interest. When the prisoner is taken way, our attention turns to the next case. When the door is
locked against the prisoner, we do not think about what is behind it.").
63. See id. This lack of knowledge is illustrated by the reaction of the public to 2011 hunger strikes by
prisoners in California, challenging their long-term isolation and other basic conditions. See generally Rebecca
McCray & Tanya Greene, California Prisoners on Hunger Strike Again to Protest Solitary Confinement, ACLU
BLOG (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights/california-prisoners-hunger-strike-again-protest-
solitary-confinement Upon learning of these conditions there was significant public outrage, resulting in a
statewide hearing about the prison conditions and an investigation by the Office of Inspector General. See Rina
Palta, Inspector General Evaluates Hunger Strike Response, THE INFORMANT (Oct. 20, 2011), http://
informant.kalwnews.org/201 I / 10/inspector-general-evaluates-hunger-strike-response; Sal Rodriguez, Historic Cali-
fornia Assembly Hearing on Solitary Confinement, SOLITARY WATCH (Aug. 24, 2011), http://solitarywatch.com/
2011/08/24/historic-california-assembly-hearing-on-solitary-confinement. The challenged conditions, however,
had existed for years or decades without protest or questioning by the general public.
64. While facts used in the hypothetical example are not an exact match, see Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 07-CV-02471, 2011 WL 4552540 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2011) for the general factual background used
in the hypothetical. Any inner thoughts ascribed to the judge throughout this paper are entirely conjecture.
65. The number of individuals housed in solitary confinement is unclear due to lack of reporting and variance
in the definition, and estimates range from 20,000 to 120,000. Joseph B. Allen, Extending Hope into "The Hole":
Applying Graham v. Florida to Supermax Prisons, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 217, 226 (2011).
66. In the past several years, increased attention has been paid to solitary confinement, with a growing number
of government officials and other organizations-including the United Nations, the ABA, the American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU"), the European Court for Human Rights and others-speaking out against the
long-term use of this practice. See id. at 235-41 (discussing international opinion). Many legislatures have limited
the use of extended solitary confinement, and most rccently the United States Senate held a subcommittee meeting
to evaluate the use of solitary confinement in the federal Bureau of Prisons. See Reassessing Solitary
Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary
Subcomm. on the Const., Human Rts., and Civil Rts., 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://solitarywatch.com/
resources/testimony (last visited Jan. 7, 2013) (compiling written and oral testimony from hearing); see also Stop
Solitary, ACLU, available at http://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights/stop-solitary-state-specific-resources (last vis-
ited Jan. 7, 2013) (listing information on state changes, including bill banning minors in solitary confinement in
California; the closing of the main "supermax" prison in Illinois; Colorado's reduction of the number of prisoners
in isolation; and consideration of solitary confinement in Virginia legislature).
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show he developed depression as a result of these conditions? What if he
experienced these conditions and did not develop depression or another illness?
The results of cases challenging long-term solitary confinement vary greatly. 6 7
Determining the seriousness of a condition based on actual harm is already
difficult, but courts face an even more complicated task when asked to assess
whether a condition's potential harm is sufficiently "serious." The Supreme Court
has expressly stated that prospective harm is actionable, as any condition that
places a prisoner at "substantial risk of serious harm" satisfies the objective
prong.68 However, courts struggle to define "substantial risk." 6 9 For example, it is
unclear whether the risk is to an "average" prisoner7 0 or to the particular
prisoner-plaintiff.71 Meanwhile, other courts have ignored the law of potential risk
completely and require an "actual showing of harm."72 It is plausible that these
jurists are not dismissing risk of harm entirely, but are simply being unclear or
inexplicit in their determination that a risk is "not substantial." The varying
approaches nevertheless reflect a lack of uniformity in court decisions.
Because of the confusion, when challenges are made to conditions absent from
the "known list" of basic human needs, courts puzzle over how to determine what
deprivations are sufficient to trigger Eighth Amendment protection. Predictably,
there are numerous disparate rulings concerning whether particular conditions are
actionable, including: long-term solitary confinement,73 uncomfortable cell tem-
67. Compare Wilkerson v. Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d 654 (M.D. La. 2007) (finding obvious risks and harms in
long term solitary confinement, sufficient to implicate the Eighth Amendment), with Silverstein, 2011 WL
4552540 at *18-21 (finding thirty years of solitary confinement not sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective
prong), and In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d 464, 471-72
(4th Cir. 1999) (finding solitary confinement did not deny a "basic human need").
68. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (holding exposure to second hand smoke posed an
"unreasonable risk of serious damage to [prisoner's] future health" and stated an Eighth Amendment claim).
While this opinion was significant, in some respects it was only an articulation of what already existed. For
example, no courts had suggested starvation had to result before denial of food was actionable. See, e.g., Dearman
v. Woodson, 429 F.2d 1288, 1289 (10th Cir. 1970) (holding prisoner who was deprived of food for over fifty hours
had a viable Eighth Amendment claim).
69. See generally Elizabeth Alexander & David C. Fathi, Smoking, The Perception of Risk, and the Eighth
Amendment, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 691 (1994).
70. See generally John J. Rolecki, Comment, Helling Revisited: Is it Time to Functionally Dispatch with the
Social Tolerance Prong of the ETS Exposure Claims?, 13 U. PA. J. CoNsT. L. 1411, 1426 (2011) (discussing issue
of using average standard for prisoner plaintiffs under Helling).
71. See, e.g., Chavarria v. Stacks, 102 F. App'x 433, 436-37 (5th Cir. 2004) (denying relief because individual
plaintiff could not demonstrate individual harm from lights being on 24 hours a day); Silverstein, 2011 WL
4552540 at * 18-21 (denying relief because individual plaintiff did not demonstrate harm from long-term solitary
confinement, despite evidence of risk of harm to an average prisoner).
72. See, e.g., King v. Frank, 371 F. Supp. 2d 977, 985 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (finding no violation where constant
illumination had not yet led to loss of sleep or other problems); Chavarria, 102 F. App'x at 436-37 (same);
Silverstein, 2011 WL 4552540 at *18-21 (failing to consider risk of harm); O'Neal v. Brenes, No. EDCV
09-1884-DDP, 2009 WL 3785572, *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (dismissing case because plaintiff did not allege
deprivation of food caused him to "suffer physical effects").
73. See cases cited supra, note 67.
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peratures,74 Continuous lighting, lack of windows in cells, sleeping on mat-
tresses on the floor,7 7 noise in the cellblock,7 8 vermin infestation, 79 non-functional
plumbing,80 unsafe transportation 8 1 and exposure to toxic fumes.8 2
Even when a condition is generally accepted as sufficiently serious, the reason
for its acceptance is rarely articulated. For example, exercise is generally
accepted as a basic human need.84 It was added to the "list" of basic needs in the
Court's 1991 decision, Wilson v. Seiter,8 5 even though common experience sug-
gests exercise is not essential for survival86 and prisoners are still able to perform
74. Compare Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding "severe discomfort" from
inside temperatures during Florida summers did not violate Eighth Amendment), with Dixon v. Godinez, 114 E3d
640, 644 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding the Eighth Amendment entitles prisoners "not to be confined in a cell at so low a
temperature as to cause severe discomfort").
75. Compare LeMaire v. Maass, 745 E Supp. 623, 636 (D. Or. 1990) (holding keeping cell lights on for
24 hours a day is unconstitutional), with Chavarria, 102 F App'x at 436-37 (holding constant illumination is not
unconstitutional because it serves a security interest).
76. Compare Rutherford v. Pitchess, 710 F.2d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 1983), with Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp.
594, 610, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
77. Compare Union Cnty. Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that making
prisoners sleep on floor mattresses for more than a few days is unconstitutional), with Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau
Cnty., 88 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that making prisoners sleep for thirteen nights on floor mattress
did not violate the Constitution under the circumstances).
78. Compare Benjamin v. Fraser, 161 F. Supp. 2d 151, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding excessive noise
contributed to difficulty sleeping and may constitute the deprivation of a basic human need), with Johnson v.
Lynaugh, 800 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. App. 1990) (dismissing claim for excessive noise as frivolous), and Givens
v. Jones, 900 F.2d 1229, 1234 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding noise and fumes are insufficient to establish an Eighth
Amendment violation even when prisoner alleged migraines).
79. Compare Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 E3d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding allegations of rodent infestation
supported an Eighth Amendment claim), with Warren v. Stempson, 800 F. Supp. 991, 992-93 (D.D.C. 1992)
(finding an allegation of vermin infestation did not state an Eighth Amendment claim).
80. Compare Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding inadequate sanitation deprived
prisoners of basic element of hygiene), with Wilson v. Cooper, 922 F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (N.D. 111. 1996) (finding
being held in cell for days without running water was "not sufficiently egregious" to violate the constitution).
81. Compare Davis v. Stanley, 740 E Supp. 815, 817-18 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (finding no Eighth Amendment
violation from allegations that officers engaged in high speed chase during transport), and Dexter v. Ford Motor
Co., 92 E App'x 637, 640 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding no Eighth Amendment claim stated where inmate was not
allowed to use a seatbelt and was paralyzed when transport vehicle was involved in a traffic accident), with Allah
v. Goord, 405 F. Supp. 2d 265, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding an Eighth Amendment claim where inmate who
required wheelchair was transported in a non-accessible van).
82. Compare Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 485-87 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding allegations that ventilation
system was contaminated with black mold and fiberglass supported Eighth Amendment claim), with Givens,
900 F.2d at 1234 (finding subjecting prisoner for three weeks to fumes from housing renovations did not violate
Eighth Amendment even if the fumes caused the prisoner to experience migraines).
83. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (stating exercise is a "single, identifiable human
need").
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Exercise is known to combat obesity and reduce risks for obesity related diseases. However, the fact that
exercise may not be necessary for life is demonstrated by studies showing even as more Americans are classified
obese, their life expectancy continues to rise. Steven Reinberg, Smoking, Obesity Slowing Growth of U.S. Life
Expectancy, Report Finds, US NEWS, (Jan. 25, 2011), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/family-health/heart/
articles/2011/01/25/smoking-obesity-slowing-us-life-expectancy-report-finds.
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limited exercise in their cells. Moreover, the Court did not reveal its thought
process behind the addition; neither do the lower courts following Seiter."
Instead, the courts rely on the "obviousness" that lack of exercise threatens
prisoners' physical and mental health, even though the harm has never actually
been proven. 8 While people may agree that physical exercise is a human need,
that simple declaration-without analysis-does little to assist future courts in
knowing how to address novel allegations that a particular deprivation is a "basic
human need."
The uncertainty has prompted concerns that judges are simply deciding cases
based on personal opinions. This concern is not the fault of the judge. Absent
legislation or public opinion data about a specific condition, both of which rarely
exist, it is understandable that judges turn to their own subjective views of what
seems acceptable. The result is that the objective prong has become highly
subjective.
2. The Problem of Why
Another issue with the objective prong is whether courts should consider why
a condition was imposed when assessing its seriousness. The reason underlying
a condition is essential to most people's basic evaluation of whether a condition
is acceptable. For example, it is generally considered cruel to cut a person with a
knife. Yet, if the person wielding the knife is a surgeon about to perform a
life-saving procedure, the sense of cruelty disappears. Separating the assessment
of whether a condition is cruel from the reason underlying it is effectively
impossible because the determination of what is a "basic human need" will often
be influenced by one's perceptions about why the condition exists.
A condition's penological purpose cannot be neatly excised from decisions
about basic human needs. In Estelle, the Court noted "[t]he infliction of such
unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency.""
Conditions have also been found to violate the Eighth Amendment when they
cause pain for no reason 90 or serve no legitimate end.9' For example, courts have
87. See, e.g., Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304 (adding exercise to list of needs without explanation); Delaney v.
DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Given current norms, exercise is no longer considered an optional
form of recreation, but is instead a necessary requirement for physical and mental well-being.").
88. See Delaney, 256 F.3d at 685 ("[W]e have acknowledged the strong likelihood of psychological injury
when segregated prisoners are denied all access to exercise for more than 90 days . . . ."); Lopez v. Smith,
203 F.3d 1122, 1133 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring no showing of adverse medical effects where prisoner alleged
denial of exercise for more than six weeks).
89. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
90. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (invalidating use of "hitching post" because it served no legitimate
end and caused pain).
91. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103; see also Hope, 536 U.S. at 738. In 2002, the Supreme Court decided Hope v.
Pelzer, a case challenging the use of a "hitching post" for discipline. 536 U.S. at 738. Even though the prison
alleged the post was necessary for discipline, the Court dismissed the assertion and held the policy was
unconstitutional because it caused pain without furthering a legitimate penological interest. Id. at 738. At no point
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ruled conditions such as requiring an HIV-positive inmate to wear a facemask,
mandatory cross gender strip searches, and use of pepper spray on a mentally ill
inmate invalid because they cause pain without any legitimate purpose.92
Courts have also used this reasoning in reverse, deeming conditions insuffi-
ciently serious because they are based on a legitimate end.93 For example, it is
undisputed that food is a basic human need and denial of food--even for a few
days-is sufficiently serious to raise an Eighth Amendment claim.94 However, if
the denial is based upon noncompliance with a prison rule, courts often find the
denial of food is not objectively harmful under the Eighth Amendment.
Accordingly, it is unclear whether a condition that causes a prisoner pain, but is
necessary to maintain prison safety, implicates the Eighth Amendment. For
example, suppose people hear our hypothetical Mr. Jones has been held in isolation
for three decades and want to know the reasons for this treatment. In assessing
whether the isolation is acceptable-or whether it is cruel-it matters if Mr. Jones
is segregated arbitrarily or because of a justified security risk. The conclusion as to
whether his conditions are a problem relates both to the harm caused by the
isolation and the reason it was imposed. If Mr. Jones is a model prisoner, isolated at
random and without explanation, many would view the treatment as unacceptable.
Yet, if he is isolated because of repeated and continuous assaults, it may be
regarded as reasonable and necessary.
Situations regularly arise where a prisoner is denied a basic human need and
did the Court consider whether the post violated a "basic human need," a claim that would have been difficult to
substantiate. Resulting from this case there is controversy regarding whether claims that a condition causes
"pain without a purpose" state an independent action (outside of the "basic human needs" context). Compare
Hope, 536 U.S. at 738 (finding colorable claim where there was pain without legitimate purpose); with Wilkerson
v. Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d 654, 666-67 (M.D. La. 2007) (finding no independent Eighth Amendment action for
allegations that conditions caused pain without purpose). This point is largely semantic as claims of pain can be
raised under the basic human need of reasonable safety. See Alexander & Fathi, supra note 69, at 693.
92. Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F3d 1288, 1311 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding use did not further legitimate interest
because inmate's history of mental illness and psychotic episodes rendered him unable to comply); Perkins v.
Kan. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 810-11 (10th Cir. 1999) (forcing inmate to wear a face mask "meant to brand
him" as HIV positive satisfied the objective prong); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1526-28 (9th Cir. 1993)
(showing cross gender searches re-traumatized sexual assault and abuse victims and that these searches were not
justified by security concerns because female guards were available).
93. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Briley, 403 F.3d 952, 952 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding denial of food acceptable because
it was a result of prisoners' non-compliance with a prison regulation); Chavarria v. Stacks, 102 F. App'x 433,
436-37 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding use of lights twenty-four hours a day did not state Eighth Amendment claim
because of security needs); Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 212 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding denial of food acceptable
because it was caused by prisoner's voluntary refusal to comply with prison regulations).
94. The Supreme Court has noted in dicta that it would be an Eighth Amendment violation to deny a prisoner
an "identifiable human need such as food." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). Other courts have found
even short denials of food satisfy the objective prong. See Simmons v. Cook, 154 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 1998)
(denial of four consecutive meals); Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cty., Tex., 929 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1991) (twelve
days); Dearman v. Woodson, 429 F.2d 1288, 1289 (10th Cir. 1970) (more than fifty hours); but see Talib, 138 F.3d
at 214 n.3 (denial of one out of every nine meals is not a constitutional violation when coupled with prisoner's
non-compliance with prison meal service policy).
95. Talib, 138 F.3d at 214; Rodriguez, 403 F.3d at 952-53.
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prison officials claim the denial is necessary. 9 6 For example, a prisoner's clothes
are taken away, causing him to shiver uncontrollably, but the prison staff members
testify that his garments pose a suicide risk,97 or a prisoner provides evidence that
having the lights on twenty-four hours a day causes him headaches and blurred
vision, but the prison administrators claim the policy furthers nighttime safety.98
It seems virtually impossible to ask courts to assess these conditions without
looking at the reason they are imposed. Yet the Supreme Court has not stated the
prison's reason for a given condition should be considered in the objective inquiry,
resulting in uncertainty and hesitancy to rely on alleged prison interests in
practice. 99
Part of this reluctance also results from an interpretation of the Eighth Amend-
ment as a normative dictate against inhumane conditions.'" Some courts and
practitioners assert the Eighth Amendment exists to provide ultimate limits,
prohibiting certain conditions as cruel, no matter what purpose may exist for
them.' The Eighth Amendment not only protects prisoners but also ensures our
society continues to use humane and acceptable practices. 10 2 Accordingly, these
theorists would make bright line rules to ban qualifying conditions, such as torture
96. Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1307 ("We balance these standards of decency against prison officials' need to keep
the prison safe."); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F3d 807, 813-14 (9th Cir. 2009) (balancing basic human need for food
against prison officials' interest in security and enforcement of policy); Talib, 138 F.3d at 214 (same); Rodriguez,
403 F.3d at 953 (balancing basic human need for food and hygiene against prison officials' interest in security and
enforcement of policy).
97. Eze v. Higgins, No. 95-CV-6S, 1996 WL 861935, at *8-9 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1996).
98. Chavarria v. Stacks, 102 F. App'x 433, 436-37 (5th Cir. 2004).
99. See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amend-
ment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559 (2006) (arguing that despite benefits to prison
interests of castration for sex offenders, this should be banned under the Eighth Amendment).
100. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) ("[Plunishments which inflict
torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, [and] the stretching of limbs ... were rendered impossible
by the Declaration of Rights...."); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) ("[I]t is safe to affirm that
punishments of torture ... and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by [the Eighth]
[A]mendment. . . .") (quoting Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of "Unusual": The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation,
102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1739 (2008) (arguing the Eighth Amendment should be read to limit the government's ability
to introduce new or innovative punishments that are significantly harsher than traditional punishments for the
same crime).
101. For example, some people argue the Eighth Amendment prohibits the application of certain punishments,
even when the defendant chooses them. See Steven A. Blum, Public Executions: Understanding the "Cruel and
Unusual Punishments" Clause, 19 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 413, 451 (1992) ("One may not consent to cruel and
unusual punishment."); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let's Make A Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by Selecting a
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REv. 615 (2000) (arguing waiver should not be permitted because
conditions should be impermissible under all circumstances).
102. The Supreme Court has stated "[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than
the dignity of man." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). The Court also noted "[t]he [Eighth] Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," id. at
101, and it must be "flexible and dynamic," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171, 173 (1978). See also Dolovich,
supra note 9, at 945 (discussing whether prisons and prison officials should be held to an objective standard of
institutional knowledge when prison conditions fall below basic levels, regardless of their subjective knowledge);
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or denial of food, because these conditions cannot be justified and prison officials
should not have an opportunity to do so.
There is also fear that too much deference will be granted to prison staff if they
are allowed to explain their practices.10 3 Courts often defer to the experience of
those managing the prisons in making their decisions.'0 They know they are not
prison experts and fear making a decision that could cost staff or prisoners their
lives. 0 5 Non-Eighth Amendment challenges against prison regulations that burden
constitutional rights only succeed if there is no "rational basis" for the violation-a
standard that permits regular and extensive deference to the judgment of prison
staff.'06 When used in the Eighth Amendment context, this extensive deference is
troubling because it effectively enables violators-the prison officials-to judge
their own offenses.
Despite these concerns a fundamental question is whether it is possible to ignore
the reasons underlying a condition during objective review? It is regular societal
practice to consider the reason behind any punishment-from spanking to a
criminal sentence-in assessing that practice. '07 Many courts consider the reasons
underlying a challenged condition, but they exclude it from the objective prong or
simply do not disclose their reasoning,' 08 deeming the objective prong satisfied.' 09
Karl M. Manheim, The Capital Punishment Cases: A Criticism of Judicial Method, 12 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 85,
90-92 (1978) (providing an overview of a normative or flexible interpretation of the Eighth Amendment).
103. See generally Mikel-Meredith Weidman, Comment, The Culture of Judicial Deference and the Problem
of Supermax Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1506-46 (2004) (discussing significant deference given to state
penological interests, particularly in Eighth Amendment claims against supermax prisons).
104. Most violations of constitutional rights in prison are reviewed under a deferential rational basis test.
Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). The Court in Turner urged deference towards prison officials, stating
"'the problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable' . . .and separation of powers concerns counsel
a policy of judicial restraint." Id. at 84-85 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)). This
tendency towards deference is borne out by empirical analysis. Adam Winider conducted a study of cases
applying strict scrutiny to determine if there were areas of law, or types of institutions or cases, where a law or
practice was more likely to be upheld, even under this heightened level of review. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory
and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793 (2006).
His research demonstrated that courts have upheld "[plenal institution policies" seventy-four percent of the time,
when reviewed under strict scrutiny. Id. at 818. This "survival rate" was the highest of any enacting institution
considered in his research. See id. Ultimately, Winkler concluded "even where courts apply this supposedly
rigorous standard of review, the [typical rational basis review] may still exert some gravitational pull on judicial
decisionmaking toward deference." Id. at 819.
105. See Winkler, supra note 104, at 819 ("Courts are famously unwilling to oversee prison policies with too
demanding an eye for fear of interfering with the security of inmates and prison personnel.").
106. Under Turner, 482 U.S- at 92-93, the standard is notably deferential and prevents the courts from
micro-managing prisons or interfering in issues where they lack expertise.
107. See cases cited supra note 40.
108. See infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Eyman, 17 F App'x 449, 452, 454 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding prisoner that spent
sixteen hours in shackles without use of bathroom failed to state an objective claim because prisoner had
"creat[ed] a dangerous disturbance"); Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591-92 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating removal of
prisoner's toenail without pain killers does not "remotely strike[] us as inhumane or a denial of the minimal
necessities of a civilized society").
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For example, in lockdowns-where prisoners are kept in their cells twenty-four
hours per day and denied exercise, showers, library access, outdoor access, and
other privileges for security or administrative reasons" 0-- courts generally assume
there is a legitimate interest supporting the restrictions, and treat deprivations
during lockdowns differently than the same deprivations at other times."' Thus,
some courts seem to be taking the reason for a condition into account.112
In many cases, the deference of courts to prison officials' judgments is ex-
plicit.11 3 In these cases, including nearly all Eighth Amendment challenges raised
in the Fifth Circuit, if prison staff asserts any reason for a condition, the judge will
find the challenged practice to be acceptable.'1 4 Thus, the prison staff's assessment
that a condition is necessary actually precludes Eighth Amendment review. 1 5This
treatment has the consequence of making the objective prong subjective, as the
court's analysis is based entirely on the opinions of prison staff.'16 While such
deference may be comfortable and expedient for courts, it effectively eliminates
the objective prong and negates judicial review of challenged conditions.
Although it is impossible to pinpoint the degree and regularity with which courts
defer to prison staff opinions, empirical evidence"' 7 and decision comments" 8
110. See generally Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599, 600 & n. 1 (9th Cir. 1980) (discussing possible
justifications for an emergency lockdown, and the restrictions which might reasonably be imposed).
111. Id. at 603 (holding objective prong was not satisfied where five-month lockdown and twenty-eight day
deprivation of outdoor exercise was in response to a "genuine emergency"); Noorwood v. Woodford, 583 F. Supp.
2d 1200 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (finding lockdown specific to plaintiff that resulted in thirty-nine day denial of exercise
satisfied objective prong); Fisher v. Barbieri, No. 3:95-CV-913 (D. Conn. May 19, 1999) (cited in Waring v.
Meachum, 175 F. Supp. 2d 230,239 (D. Conn. 2001)) (finding no violation where showers were prohibited during
twenty-eight day lockdown); Alley v. Angelone, 962 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Va. 1997) (upholding "laundry list" of
deprivations because prisoners "were not entitled to due process" prior to institutional lockdown); McLeod v.
Scully, No. 81-CV-3139, 1984 WL 692, at *3 (S.D.N.Y July 30, 1984) (finding no violation where prison
deprived inmates of showers during eight day lockdown).
112. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text
113. Another response by courts has been to address the prison staff's interest in the challenged condition
during the second prong of this test, by assessing the mindset of those sued. For example, in Richard v. Reed,
49 F. Supp. 2d 485,488 (E.D. Va. 1999), a prisoner was denied outdoor access for 100 days. The court found there
was no showing of deliberate indifference "because there may be legitimate security reasons for the restrictions."
Id. (emphasis added). Notably, while interest and intent are related and may overlap, these two issues are distinct:
the prison staff may have a reason for a condition or policy and yet still have been deliberately indifferent to the
harm the policy was causing.
114. See id.
115. See, e.g., Chavarria v. Stacks, 102 F. App'x 433, 436-37 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding prisoner's claims that
lights were on twenty-four hours a day was frivolous, and holding "a prison regulation that infringes upon a
prisoner's constitutional rights will be upheld if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests").
116. See Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 934-35 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting deference should be granted to prison
officials and upholding strip search policy as "plainly constitutional" because of prison's stated reasons for its
implementation).
117. Winkler, supra note 104, at 818.
118. See Chavarria, 102 F. App'x at 437 (Reavley, J., specially concurring) ("But with deference to those who
are concerned about Mr. Chavarria's illuminated cell, I regard this judicial attention as much ado about nothing. A
little cloth over his eyes would solve the problem, negate deprivation, and escape this exercise in frivolity.");
Norris v. District of Columbia, 737 F.2d 1148, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The reality is that the incidence of direct
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show the necessity of a condition is often a crucial factor in whether it survives
Eighth Amendment scrutiny. Without a framework for considering penological
interest, prison officials therefore effectively decide what is "objectively" bad and
the proverbial fox is left guarding the hen house.
B. The "Subjective" Prong
Once an objective harm is shown, a prisoner must demonstrate the prison
official acted with a sufficiently culpable mindset, meaning he or she was
deliberately indifferent to the serious condition." 9 The importance of the mindset
requirement is definitional. To be "punishment" under the terms of the Eighth
Amendment, there must be some level of intentionality.12 0 This sentiment is
summed up in the oft-repeated quote from Judge Posner: "if the guard accidentally
stepped on the prisoner's toe and broke it, this would not be punishment in
anything remotely like the accepted meaning of the word." 2 1
Generally, a prison staff member will have acted with deliberate indifference
when: (1) he or she knew the risk to a prisoner posed by a condition, and
(2) disregarded it by failing to take specific measures to abate it. 12 2 The application
of this requirement poses particular problems for plaintiffs seeking injunctive
relief and challenging institutional policies and practices. Namely, it creates the
problem of ongoing harms and the problem of institutional knowledge.
1. The Problem of Ongoing Harms
The Eighth Amendment "subjective" prong is actually a hybrid of subjective
and objective components. The knowledge component is subjective. 12 3 A plaintiff
must show that a prison official had actual knowledge of a condition's harm, not
simply that he or she should have known harm would result. 124 The test therefore
applications of governmental force is markedly higher in prisons than outside prisons. It is probable that
justification for the use of force will be found, properly, more frequently in cases arising in prisons than in those
arising elsewhere."); Rue v. Gusman, No. 09-CV-6480, 2010 WL 1930936, at *7 (E.D. La. May 11, 2010) ("It has
been noted that policies mandating constant illumination are grounded in security concerns and are constitu-
tional.").
119. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
120. See id. at 837-38 (finding an official must be aware of the risk of harm to a prisoner in order to be liable
under the Eighth Amendment, as "[t]his approach comports best with the text of the Amendment as our cases have
interpreted it"); supra text accompanying note 13.
121. Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985).
122. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43, 846 n.9.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 838. While it may seem reasonable that prison officials are not held liable if they did not have actual
knowledge of a problem, this standard does not always accurately assess culpability. Courts and commentators
have pointed out the actual knowledge requirement provides an incentive to be unaware of risks and harms
occurring in the prison, and may result in prison officials actively (and culpably) avoiding such knowledge. See
Dolovich, supra note 9, at 945 (discussing whether prisons and prison officials should be held to an objective
standard of institutional knowledge, regardless of their subjective knowledge).
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prevents an officer from being held liable for lack of knowledge or mistake.' 2 5 The
response component is then objective. Once a plaintiff shows a prison official was
aware of a problem, the court must evaluate whether the official responded in a
reasonable manner.12 6
In practice, the subjective knowledge component does not exist in injunctive
cases. If harm is ongoing, the lawsuit itself notifies defendants of the challenged
harm, rendering the knowledge requirement superfluous. 127 The inquiry then turns
on whether prison staff responded to the harm or risk in an objectively reasonable
manner. Courts often find prison staff failed to do so, as judges hesitate to permit
an ongoing harm, but then conclude that an official is powerless to stop a damaging
condition.12 8
The subjective prong also follows the court's initial objective determination that
the condition is sufficiently serious to merit Eighth Amendment protection. A
judge will have already heard substantial evidence about these harms, including
specific details about how prisoners are being hurt,129 but cannot stop the harm
unless he or she finds deliberate indifference. In light of that evidence, judges may
feel a responsibility to protect those in custody or experience cognitive dissonance
if they have identified a significant harm, but can do nothing to stop it.'3 0 Therefore
in the face of a dangerous, ongoing harm, judges and juries may act to ensure the
problem is solved, even finding intent when evidence is limited or spotty.
Although a court is not likely to admit such reasoning explicitly, several court
125. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
126. Id. at 844-45.
127. Id. at 846 n.9 ("If ... the evidence before a district court establishes that an inmate faces an objectively
intolerable risk of serious injury, the defendants could not plausibly persist in claiming lack of awareness . . . .").
128. While I do not have empirical evidence to demonstrate this point, I think judges-like most people-are
hesitant to see an ongoing harm and determine they are unable to act to stop it. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Stadler,
639 F. Supp. 2d 654, 669-70 (M.D. La. 2007) (rejecting claim by officials that housing assignment was necessary,
as a matter of law, for general security interest, when it was causing harm to plaintiffs); Plata v. Schwarzenegger,
No. COI-1351-TEH, 2005 WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005) (finding that despite improvements and efforts
made by officials to improve medical care, they remained deliberately indifferent and ordering takeover of
medical care by third-party receiver).
129. In injunctive cases the condition will always be ongoing because, even after the commencement of a
lawsuit, prison officials can still prevent liability if they fix the problem or remove the harmful condition. Farmer,
511 U.S. at 846 n.9 (1994) ("[E]ven prison officials who had a subjectively culpable state of mind when the
lawsuit was filed could prevent issuance of an injunction by proving, during the litigation, that they were no
longer unreasonably disregarding an objectively intolerable risk of harm and that they would not revert to their
obduracy upon cessation of the litigation.").
130. Cognitive dissonance theory, pioneered by Leon Festinger, predicts that when individuals experience
high levels of disconnect or conflict between their behaviors and their beliefs, they will feel strong psychological
pressure to reduce that dissonance. See generally LEON FESTINGER, CONFLICT, DECISION, AND DISSONANCE 8
(1964) (considering the difference between pre-decision and post-decision cognitive processes, and whether a
decision once made will produce bias in the decisionmaker's rationale); LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNrrTIVE
DISSONANCE 3 (1957) (elaborating on the importance of cognitive dissonance as a motivating force). In other
words, when a person holds two contradictory beliefs (here, the belief that prisoners are being harmed and the
knowledge that the law does not allow intervention), it causes discomfort and produces a drive to modify or reject
one of the inconsistent ideas.
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decisions support this point. For example, the District Court of Wyoming found
the fact that officers were simply ignoring prisoners being threatened and beaten
by other prisoners to be a sufficiently serious harm.131 However, the defendants
were also in the process of re-training their staff to ensure better safety, a response
that could have been found reasonable.'13 Yet the court found in favor of the
prisoners on summary judgment, stating the officials showed deliberate indiffer-
ence' 3 3 and "the Court is not impressed by such measures unless they are
accompanied by genuine good-faith efforts to ensure actual compliance with the
policies."' 3 4
Judges are also likely to find deliberate indifference if they considered the
reason for the condition during the objective analysis. Namely, if a judge decides
the penological interest for a condition is insufficient, he or she is inherently
deciding the officers did not act reasonably.135 For example, in the Eleventh
Circuit, a mentally ill prisoner challenged the repeated use of pepper spray against
him.13 6 The court found the harm sufficiently serious because there was no
legitimate state interest in using chemical agents against the prisoner due to his
mental disability. 137 In the deliberate indifference prong, the court found the risk of
harm was obvious and the repeated use of pepper spray was unreasonable.' 3 8 Had
the staff taken any mitigating steps-such as trying other restraint methods or
involving mental health staff in subduing the prisoner-the condition likely would
not have been found to be sufficiently serious in the first place.
For this reason, the utility of the "subjective prong" is often subsumed by the
objective test in injunctive cases. Although this approach may not be problematic
as a normative matter, the ability to draw this inference in injunctive cases should
be made explicit.
2. The Problem of Institutional Knowledge and Intent
Another issue in is that agency intent is notoriously difficult to prove. In cases
involving a discrete action, a plaintiff can prove intent by simply showing an
individual's reasons for enacting a condition.' 3 9 While there are problems inherent
in proving any individual's subjective mindset, courts and juries are seen as able to
131. Skinner v. Uphoff, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1215-16 (D. Wyo. 2002).
132. Id. at 1211.
133. Id. at 1216.
134. Id. at 1215.
135. See Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2010); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528-29
(9th Cir. 1993).
136. Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1293.
137. Id. at 1311-12.
138. Id. at 1313-16.
139. But see discussion infra Part I.B.
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resolve them.140 However, when determining intent behind general institutional
practices and policies, judges are far more likely to simply substitute their own
view of the institution.
This challenge is illustrated by returning to Mr. Jones. Imagine he is subjected to
a policy that requires his cell to have a light on twenty-four hours a day. The policy
was put into place by an administrator for security purposes, as the prison staff
must be able to see Mr. Jones at all times, but the light is causing Mr. Jones to lose
sleep and his eyesight is declining. Assuming the court finds the lighting to be
sufficiently serious under the objective prong, whose intent should be looked at to
determine if the prison is culpable?l 4 1
In prisons, many actors with multiple mental states create and implement
policies. One officer may enjoy watching Mr. Jones suffer in his cell, while another
may think the treatment is cruel but is unable to alter Mr. Jones's conditions. The
administrator who put the policy in place may have no knowledge that the lights
are causing Mr. Jones harm, while another may know of the alleged harm but
decline to change the situation. Can the mental state of any of these individuals be
said to reflect the intent of the prison?
Much has been written in scholarly literature about the imprecision, at times
called the "slop," of institutional intent. 142 This concern arises in many contexts,
including employment discrimination lawsuits, First Amendment challenges, ex
post facto application, and double jeopardy cases.14 3 In the punishment context,
Alice Ristroph explains that a fact finder's assessment of institutional intent relies
140. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2011) (explaining general intent requirements: nearly all
crimes are assigned a requisite mental state ajury must find in order to establish criminal liability); Alice Ristroph,
State Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353, 1364 (2008) ("For the most
part, fact-finders appear comfortable making mental state determinations for individual defendants, even with
only circumstantial evidence.").
141. This is generally not an issue in actual cases; the knowledge and intent in question is of whomever the
plaintiff has sued. The hypothetical indicates, however, how difficult it is to identify who is the appropriate party
to sue and who should be held accountable.
142. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("Inquiries into congressional motives or
purposes are a hazardous matter."); Dolovich, supra note 9, at 923-28 (exploring whether an institution may be
deemed "cruel," and whether purposeful intent or merely lack of sensitivity to the prisoner's suffering is
required); Michael S. Moore, Patrolling the Border of Consequentialist Justifications: The Scope of Agent-
Relative Restrictions, 27 LAW & PHIL. 35, 48-53 (2008) (arguing for a general consequentialist view of intent,
based on the concept that any definitional classification of intent "inevitably will have some slop in it"); Ristroph,
supra note 140, at 1357 (discussing the ambiguity caused by imprecision in determining institutional intent);
Pamela S. Karlan, Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent,
93 YALE L.J. 111, 119-21 (1983) (considering "the problem of group intent" in light of the different levels of
intent recognized by the Model Penal Code); Note, The Irrational Application of Rational Basis: Kimel, Garrett,
and Congressional Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2146, 2157-59 (2001)
[hereinafter Irrational Application] (discussing the deference courts traditionally show legislatures, as resulting
from the difficulty in assessing legislative intent as compared with the intent of an individual or small group).
143. Ristroph, supra note 140, at 1356-57 (discussing areas where institutional intent is relevant); Irrational
Application, supra note 142, at 2155-57 (discussing intent in discrimination cases).
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on her biases and views of the institution.'" Ristroph explains that the purpose
underlying the action of an institution-and in particular, prison systems or
legislatures-can usually be presented in a way that avoids constitutional offense
because of the deference given to these institutions.145 Ristroph notes that "[riarely
can a single coherent intent be attributed to the entire institutional apparatus that
imposes punishment. The intentions of individual officials within the criminal
justice system may be relevant to, but are not dispositive of, the question whether
the system is imposing punishment."1 46 In particular, "[e]videntiary ambiguities
allow for discretionary judgment, and courts have considerable leeway to find the
requisite intent (or not) in order to reach a preferred outcome."' 47 Overall,
Ristroph concludes that a fact-finder's view of institutional intent is inaccurate and
arbitrary.
Since institutional intent can be a proxy for a fact finder's own biases about the
institution, there is a question whether this consideration should be included in the
Eight Amendment analysis. The Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty of
this determination in institutional cases, noting "considerable conceptual difficulty
would attend any search for the subjective state of mind of a governmental entity,
as distinct from that of a governmental official." 14 8 While this Article does not
argue this requirement should be eliminated entirely, these critiques provide
further support for limiting the role of subjective intent analysis in institutional
cases.
III. EXCESSIVENESS MATTERS: OTHER EIGHTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINES AND
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
Eighth Amendment case law demonstrates the current application of the
two-prong test lacks uniformity and is vulnerable to the personal opinions of
judges. This Part looks to other areas of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for
guidance on reforming the conditions test generally and the objective prong
in particular. It does not discuss the subjective prong because no other Eighth
Amendment doctrine requires intent.
Several Eighth Amendment doctrines have been created to evaluate "penal
measures" 4 9 and assess whether punishments comport with "the evolving stan-
144. Ristruph, supra note 140, at 1357-58.
145. Id. at 1358; See also Irrational Application, supra note 142, at 2158 (discussing the difficulty of
determining legislative intent and noting "courts are reluctant to pierce the legislative veil, preferring instead to
'affirm legislative competence') (quoting Robert C. Post & Reva B. Seigel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, I10 YALE L.J. 441, 469 (2000)).
146. Ristroph, supra note 140, at 1399.
147. Id. at 1357.
148. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994).
149. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
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dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 5 0 These doctrines,
including challenges to sentences, bail, punitive fines, methods of execution, and
application of the death penalty, all center on whether a punishment is exces-
sive.'"' This focus is unsurprising as most courts and scholars regard disproportion-
ate governmental action as the crux of the Eighth Amendment.152
The prohibition on excessive punishment is also long-standing.15 3 The Eighth
Amendment itself uses the term "excessive" twice: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted." 154 In Solem v. Helm, the Supreme Court stated the prohibition against
"excessive" action applies to all forms of governmental punishment and to all
clauses of the Eighth Amendment. 55 However, despite the Court's pronounce-
ment, lower courts have not generally relied upon this limitation in conditions of
confinement cases.
In non-conditions cases, courts will find a punishment "excessive" if the
punishment does not "fit" the offense, as determined by a proportionality analysis.
A proportionality review balances the interest of the government in enacting the
punishment against the interest of the individual in avoiding suffering. 15 6 Richard
Frase has conducted a thorough review of proportionality in the Eighth Amend-
150. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Richard S.
Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under Federal and State Constitutions, 11 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 39,
49-62 (2008) (discussing uses of the Eighth Amendment).
151. Frase, supra note 150, at 49-62.
152. The concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment. Embodied in the Constitution's ban
on cruel and unusual punishments is the "precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense." Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (quoting Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
153. Excessiveness was first used as a limitation to punishment in the Magna Carta, where a provision was
added to prohibit fines being levied excessively against political dissidents. See Gerald W. Boston, Punitive
Damages and the Eighth Amendment: Application of the Excessive Fines Clause, 5 COOLEY L. REv. 667 (1988)
(giving history of the Magna Carta and how it relates to the Eighth Amendment). This principle was extended
beyond fines and adopted into English law in a form nearly identical to the modem Eighth Amendment. Id. at
705-06. A useful history of the excessiveness principle is laid out in Stephen T. Parr's article, Symmetric
Proportionality: A New Perspective on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 68 TENN. L. REV. 41 (2000).
Professor Parr argues the Founders did not intend to require proportionality analysis in the Eighth Amendment,
but the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment included this limitation on governmental power. Id. at 49-58
(citing AKHILAMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTs: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION xii (1998)).
154. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
155. 463 U.S. 277, 285-86,289 (1983) ("When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the language of
the English Bill of Rights, they also adopted the English principle of proportionality.") (citation omitted); see also
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (concluding the Eighth Amendment was designed to limit
excessive fines, bail, and punishment).
156. Bentham espoused this view, termed the principle of utility, which defines moral obligation by reference
to the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people who are affected by performance of an action. Frederick
Rosen, Introduction, in JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION at
xxxviii (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart, eds., 1996).
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ment context.157 He points out that we cannot evaluate whether a punishment is
excessive until we determine the interest we are comparing it with. In short, he
asks, "excessive relative to what?" 158 He notes that while proportionality is a term
generally used by courts and scholars, the actual analysis depends heavily on the
normative theory of punishment underlying the comparison.' 59
Punishment theories also differ in how they justify harm to the offender. In
Western culture, there are four regular justifications for punishment: retribution,
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.' 60 Traditionally, philosophers and
scholars have described these justifications as fitting into two theories, retributiv-
ism and utilitarianism. 16 1 Frase explains that the type of proportionality review
employed by courts often depends on whether it is based on a retributive or
utilitarian theory. 16 2
Retributivism is backwards-looking.16 3 It justifies the harshness of a punish-
ment by examining the severity of the crime. t Retributivists consider the harm
suffered by a victim and the blameworthiness of the criminal.' 65 This long-
standing theory has roots that reach at least as far back as to the Old Testament
Jewish law that required a punishment to match the crime, or "life for life, eye for
eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.," 6 6 In the modem sense,
retributivists do not call for punishment that is literally equivalent to the crime, but
often examine a variety of factors to determine what punishment is appropriate,
including the amount of harm to the victim, the unfair advantage the perpetrator
gained from the crime, or the moral imbalance caused by the crime.' 6 7
Frase states that when courts review proportionality based on retributive theory
("retributive review"), they compare the harshness of the sentence to the gravity of
a crime.1' A retributive approach focuses on the actor's blameworthiness, and
157. See Frase, supra note 150; Richard S. Frase. Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REv. 67 (2008); Richard
S. Frase, Excessive Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to
What?, 89 MINN. L. REv. 571 (2005).
158. Frase, supra note 150, at 40.
159. Id. at 40-47.
160. MICHAEL CAVADINO & JAMES DIGNAN, THE PENAL SYsTEM: AN INTRODUCTION 32-44 (2d ed. 1997);
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010).
161. CAVADINo & DIGNAM, supra note 160, at 33 (terming utilitarianism "reductivism"); Frase, supra note 150,
at 40-49;. Recently, commentators have urged a fifth justification: expressiveness. See Christopher Bennett,
Expressive Punishment and Political Authority, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285 (2011). Expressive punishment theory
argues the expression of deserved condemnation is the fundamental purpose of a system of punishment. Id. at 287.
This theory is retrospective and is not done for future gain or to better society. Id. For that reason, regardless of its
traction and acceptance as a punishment theory, expressive punishment can work in the proportionality review
model as a form of retributive review.
162. Frase, supra note 150, at 40-49.
163. CAVADINO & DIGNAN, supra note 160, at 39-41.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Deuteronomy 19:17-21; Exodus 21:23-27.
167. CAVADINO & DIGNAN, supra note 160, at 39-41.
168. Frase, supra note 150, at 40-41.
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compares the penalty to such factors as the severity of the crime and the culpability
of the individual offender.16 9 Retributive proportionality may therefore set an
upper limit on the punishment available for a crime, but a court can lower the
ceiling for a variety of reasons.170 Strict retributivists, however, would urge harsh
penalties for harsh crimes, even when there exists no potential for future reform or
deterrence.' 7 '
By contrast, utilitarianism is forward-looking and justifies punishment through
future societal or individual benefits.17 2 Under utilitarianism, the punishment is
viewed as a solution to societal ills of crime and deviance.' 73 The justifications of
deterring crime, increasing public safety, rehabilitating the criminal, or incapaci-
tating the criminal to reduce future crime are all utilitarian goals.' 74 The influence
of utilitarian principles on our current prison system is displayed in its vocabulary,
terms such as "corrections," "training," "treatment," and "rehabilitation" are
regularly used to describe what penal systems do.' 75
Proportionality review based on utilitarian principles ("utilitarian review")
examines the future benefit of the punishment' 7 6 to determine whether it is
working toward the goal of deterring future crime, incapacitating the offender, or
reforming the criminal.177 Frase explains that a penalty can be disproportionate
under this theory in two ways. First, under "ends-benefits" proportionality, the
good achieved by a punishment may be outweighed by the cost to society or the
harm to the individual.178 Second, under "alternative means" proportionality, a
punishment is invalid if the same goal or ends can be achieved through less harm to
the person convicted, such as a shorter sentence.179
Retributive and utilitarian proportionality reviews are illustrated in one of the
first cases to use the Eighth Amendment to limit government action, Weems v.
United States. 80 In Weems, a government employee made two inaccurate entries
in a government book and was sentenced to fifteen years of "painful as well as hard
labor."' 8 ' The Supreme Court relied on retributive and utilitarian principles to
invalidate the sentence. 18 2 The Court's statement, "that it is a precept of justice that
169. Id.
170. Id. at 41-42.
171. See generally id. at 40-41 (describing retributive proportionality).
172. CAVADINO & DIGNAN, supra note 160, at 33-36.
173. Id.; see also DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY. A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 6-7 (1990).
174. CAVADINO & DIGNAN, supra note 160, at 33-39.
175. GARLAND, supra note 173, at 7.
176. Frase, supra note 150, at 43.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 43-44.
179. Id. at 45-46.
180. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
181. Id. at 362-63, 366.
182. See id. at 381-82 (reasoning the punishment is excessive for the crime and noting that limiting
punishment still prevents the repetition of the crime in the future and reforms the criminal).
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punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense,"1 8 3 is
an example of retributivism and it found the fifteen-year sentence disproportionate
to the minor nature of the crime.184 The Court also used utilitarian principles to
examine the benefit of the law Mr. Weems violated,185 concluding that the law's
purpose was to deter future crimes and to rehabilitate offenders.18 6 Considering
these objectives, the Court found a lesser punishment would be sufficient because
"[tihe State thereby suffers nothing and loses no power. The purpose of punish-
ment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not tormenting, severity, its
repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the reformation of the criminal."1 87
Because a shorter sentence was adequate to meet the goals of punishment, the
Court held that the longer sentence was disproportionate to the crime and caused
unnecessary harm to Mr. Weems.
Since Weems, the Supreme Court and lower courts have relied on both
retributive and utilitarian proportionality reviews to evaluate state punishments. 8 8
Frase discusses that courts use different types of proportionality review interchange-
ably and fail to explain when each applies.'8 9 The Supreme Court has often relied
on retributive analysis is the essential review, but has also noted that utilitarian
goals are integral to assessing proportionality. 190 While the Court has not said so
explicitly, the current trend of decisions from the Supreme Court indicate that a
punishment will be upheld if it can be justified under either a retributive or a
utilitarian principle. 9'
Regardless of the underlying theory, proportionality review is the predominant
analysis to determine cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment,
including challenges to sentences, fines, and application to the death penalty. Yet,
183. Id. at 367.
184. Id. at 381-82.
185. See id. at 381 (concluding that the purpose of the law is to "prevent the perversion of truth in a public
document").
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Frase, supra note 150, 49-63.
189. Id. at 58-59; see also Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines": The Due Process Clause, Punitive
Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MumN. L. REV. 880, 886-88 (2004) (observing no reliable indicator for
Supreme Court's assessments of Eighth Amendment proportionality). For example, a recent Supreme Court
decision, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), invalidated the use of life without parole for juveniles by
assessing the "culpability of the offenders ... along with the severity of the punishment" and "whether the
challenged sentencing practice serve[d] legitimate goals." Id. at 2026.
190. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 280 (1972) ("Although the determination that a severe
punishment is excessive may be grounded in a judgment that it is disproportionate to the crime, the more
significant basis is that the punishment serves no penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment.")
(citation omitted).
191. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (evaluating whether punishment served either retributive or utilitarian
goals); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (same); see also William W. Berry m, Separating Retribution
From Proportionality: A Response to Stinneford, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 67 (2011) ("The Courts evolving standards of
decency doctrine has consistently explored whether a given punishment comports with any of the applicable
purposes of punishment.").
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despite its ubiquity, proportionality review is not generally used in conditions of
confinement cases.19 2 Because of the confusion and inconsistencies in the condi-
tions challenges, it is worth considering whether incorporating a proportionality
analysis is feasible and would improve the doctrine.
A. Is Proportionality Review Transferrable to Conditions Challenges?
In order to assess the applicability of proportionality review to conditions of
confinement cases, we must examine how the retributive and utilitarian theories
would function in this context.
1. Retributive Theory
Heavy reliance on the traditional retributive analysis would be largely unwork-
able in conditions of confinement cases. Retributive review generally weighs the
crime against the punishment, and is commonly used in challenges to sentences,
including the imposition of the death penalty and of fines.'9 3 For example, the
Supreme Court has overturned sentences of death for the crimes of rape and felony
murder, finding that "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment" is
forbidden.19 4 In evaluating proportionality, the Court looked to factors such as
"historical development of the punishment at issue, legislative judgments, interna-
tional opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have made.. ..".
In most circumstances, prisoners are not placed in conditions specific to their
crime, making this analysis not feasible in conditions cases.' 9 6 Weighing a prison
condition against the crime the inmate committed would result in different prison
conditions for different convictions.19 7 The outcome would be logistically disas-
trous, with the prison having to tailor conditions on an individual basis.'9 8 For
example, could officials allow a rape offender to be raped in prison? Assuming this
192. Reinert, supra note 9, at 69-73.
193. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (weighing culpability of juvenile offenders in assessing
punishment); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (finding life without parole excessive compared to crime
of issuing a bad check, even with prior criminal history).
194. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (finding the death penalty excessive for felony
murder when defendant did not take life); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (finding
a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape); id. at 601,
(Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[O]rdinarily death is disproportionate punishment for the
crime of raping an adult woman.").
195. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788-89.
196. Another reason that retributive analysis is largely not workable for conditions cases is because prison
officials do not cite retributive bases-such as punishment for a particular crime-as the basis for conditions.
Rather, officials generally cite "safety" or "security," or other future-focused bases, as justification for treatment.
To the extent that prison officials did begin to offer use retributive justifications for conditions, a court could
analyze them and weigh them under a proportionality analysis, just as is done in other areas of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Courts could compare how others with similar crimes were treated, or could take the circumstances
of unique crimes into account.
197. Reinert, supra note 9, at 69-73.
198. Id.
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would not be permitted, would more isolating conditions be acceptable for a rapist,
but unacceptable for someone who committed petty theft? The complications
arising from this type of circumstance are apparent and illogical.
Basing prison conditions on convictions would also ignore a prisoner's behavior
and experience after he is already in prison.'99 Prison classification systems place
substantial weight on a prisoner's actions while in prison. His disciplinary history,
affiliations, and family contacts all help determine what conditions are appropriate
and safe for him.2 " If the type of conviction guided proportionality, the prison
system would have to disregard the inmate's subsequent behavior. For example,
officials may not be able to isolate a prisoner who assaulted an officer, because his
conviction was a minor offense. Likewise, a prisoner convicted of murder or rape
might never be allowed out of high security conditions even when he has
demonstrated changed behavior.
While conditions cases on the whole do not lend themselves to the retributive
model of proportionality review, retributive theory could help analyze challenges
to disciplinary measures.2 0 ' In prisons, temporary penalties, such as loss of
amenities, loss of time credits, and disciplinary segregation, are imposed for
breaking prison rules.202 Since these punishments are punitive responses to
specific offenses, the retributive model could assess whether disciplinary measures
fit the violation and satisfy the objective prong.203
2. Utilitarian Theory
In contrast, utilitarian review could be helpful tool for conditions of confinement
cases. Utilitarian review weighs the individual harm of the punishment against the
benefit to society obtained from the punishment. To make this assessment, courts
must identify that the punishment serves a legitimate purpose.2 Even when there
is a legitimate purpose, a punishment can still be found excessive under utilitarian
199. A prisoner's behavior while in custody influences his conditions and placement. See, e.g., BUREAU OF
PRISONS, INMATE DISCIPLINE PROGRAM, Program Statement 5270.09 (July 2011) [hereinafter INMATE DISCIPLINE
PROGRAM] (detailing offenses and disciplinary consequences), http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5270_-009.pdf.
For example, if a prisoner is frequently fighting with others, prison officials are forced to respond, even if he is
never criminally prosecuted. See id. at Table 44 (listing fighting as "high severity level offense" and listing
possible sanctions, including segregation, fine, forfeiture of good time credits, or loss of privileges).
200. See id.; see also BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE SECURITY DESIGNATION AND CUSTODY CLASSIFICATION,
Program Statement 5100.08 (Sept. 2006) (detailing information used to determine custody level and prison
placement), http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/500l008.pdf.
201. Reinert, supra note 9, at 79-82.
202. See INMArE DISCIPLINE PROGRAM, supra note 199, at Table 44 (listing possible sanctions).
203. At times, retributive review has been used in the context of disciplinary infractions. See, e.g., Hardwick v.
Ault, 447 F. Supp. 116, 125-26 (M.D. Ga. 1978) (comparing gravity of insubordination to gravity of resulting
administrative segregation for sixteen months); Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1387-88 (D. Del. 1974)
(listing the comparison of gravity of the offense to the gravity of the disciplinary action as a relevant factor for
determining whether disciplinary action was cruel and unusual).
204. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) ("A sentence lacking any legitimate
penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense."); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,
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review if a lesser or different sentence could fulfill the goal.2 05 In conditions of
confinement cases, utilitarian review would weigh any harm to a prisoner against
the governmental interest or benefit in applying the condition. This principle is not
new. Early conditions courts used a proportionality review that was largely based
on utilitarian principles.20 In those cases, the courts examined the reason for the
condition and evaluated whether it served the prison officials' stated goals.2 07 If a
less painful or restrictive treatment could accomplish that goal, then the condition
was found to be unconstitutional.20 8 The cases show the usefulness of utilitarian
review in the conditions of confinement context.209
For example, in Moss v. Ward, a prisoner, Mr. Moss, challenged his denial of
food for four days. 2 10 Prison officials asserted the denial was necessary because
Mr. Moss had refused to return a plastic cup and therefore violated a prison
rule.2 11 The prison officials justified their punishment because they needed to
prevent prisoners from throwing urine or feces and making weapons. 212 However,
it was undisputed that Mr. Moss only wanted the cup as storage for his dentures.2 13
441 (2008) (considering potential penological interests of sentence); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19
(2002) (same); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279-80 (1972) (same).
205. Frase describes this process as "alternative-means" proportionality review. See Frase, supra note 150, at
45-46. This principle has also been described by the Supreme Court. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 ("The final
principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment must not be excessive. A punishment is excessive
under this principle if it is unnecessary .... If there is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve
the purposes for which punishment is inflicted... the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore
excessive.").
206. For examples, see infra notes 223-24. Likewise, Eighth Amendment cases challenging use of force by
prison officials have employed a utilitarian-based proportionality review; this doctrine is termed a review for
"excessive force." Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175 (2010) (examining action by officer under "excessive force"
doctrine). Prior to the firm implementation of the mindset requirement by the Supreme Court in Whitley (which
occurred in 1986), courts regularly balanced a prison official's need for force against the amount used. In making
this inquiry, courts weighed the following factors: the need for the application of force; the relationship between
the need and the amount of force used; the extent of the prisoner's injury; and whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973). Under this weighing, the Eighth Amendment was deemed
to be violated when the force used was "so unreasonable or excessive as to be clearly disproportionate to the need
reasonably perceived by prison officials at the time." Jones v. Mabry, 723 F.2d 590, 596 (8th Cir. 1983).
207. See, e.g., Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[I]t is a violation of the Eighth
Amendment for prison officials to use mace or other chemical agents in quantities greater than necessary or for the
sole purpose of punishment or the infliction of pain."); Schmitt v. Crist, 333 F. Supp. 820, 822 (D. Wis. 1971)
(weighing prison's interest in safety but finding "it is difficult to conceive of a legitimate prison objective which
requires that a prisoner be denied the use of soap, toothbrush, and clean bedding"); Landman v. Royster, 333 F.
Supp. 621, 645 (E.D. Va. 1971) (.'Security' or 'rehabilitation' are not shibboleths to justify any treatment. Still
courts must keep in mind that a recognized valid object of imprisonment is not just to separate and house prisoners
but to change them."); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (weighing legitimate needs for strip
cells with "shocking" conditions therein).
208. See, e.g., Moss v. Ward, 450 F Supp. 591 (w.D.N.Y. 1978).
209. See infra notes 223-24.
210. 450 F Supp at 591.
211. Id. at 596.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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The court relied on a utilitarian analysis to weigh the prison's interest against
Mr. Moss's harm and found the punishment disproportionate because it "[went]
beyond what is necessary to achieve a legitimate aim to wit, that it is unnecessarily
cruel in view of the purpose for which it was used." 2 14
In Bono v. Saxbe, a group of prisoners challenged the practice of closing the
doors to their cells. 2 15 The Southern District of Illinois had previously held that
permanently closed cells violate the Eighth Amendment because they were
extremely isolating, caused sensory deprivation, and the prison officials offered
"no justification for their use."2 16 As a result, the cell doors were typically open,
but prison officials occasionally closed them and the prisoners challenged these
closures.2 17 In Saxbe, the court stated that the door closing was justified because
the prison officials "demonstrated a dire need to put a stop to certain kinds of
behavior which disrupted [the unit] and threatened the health and safety of inmates
and staff."2 1 8 This interest outweighed the harm alleged by the prisoners.2 19
Despite the viability and helpfulness of utilitarian review, this type of analysis
was effectively supplanted when the current two-prong test gained favor, though
no explanation was given to justify its diminishment.22 0
B. Criticisms of Proportionality Review
Although proportionality review could be useful in conditions cases, it also
presents problems. Proportionality review, like the current objective prong, has
been criticized for its subjectivity and vulnerability to judge bias. Other critics
assert proportionality review is overly deferential to state interests, with courts
only willing to intervene in the most egregious situations. Each criticism will be
explored in turn.
1. Subjectivity
Many scholars have criticized proportionality reviews as subjective 2 2 1 and its
introduction of objective factors may not counter this criticism. 2 2 2 In retributive
214. Id. at 595.
215. Bono v. Saxbe, 527 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D. Ill. 1981).
216. Id. at 1188 (quoting Bono v. Saxbe, 450 F. Supp. 934, 948 (D. Ill. 1978)).
217. Id. at 1189.
218. Id. at 1196-97.
219. Id. at 1190-91.
220. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
221. See, e.g., Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, Democratic Pedigree,
and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REv. 1 (2010) (criticizing subjectivity of standard, confused
reasoning by the court, and methodologically inconsistent review of state practices); Tracy A. Thomas,
Proportionality and the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59 HASTiNGs L.J. 73, 118-20 (2007);
Karlan, supra note 189, at 891-903.
222. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation as
Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1089, 1097-1100 (2006) (criticizing use of
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reviews of criminal sentencing, courts evaluate "gross disproportionality" 22 3
through a series of objective factors, including: (i) the gravity of the offense and
the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions.22 4 Although the factors are now commonplace,
commentators do not believe they have actually increased objectivity. Pam Karlan
and Tracy Thomas note the standard for gross disproportionality resembles one of
"I know it when I see it"2 25 or "what-shocks-the-consciences-of-the-Justices." 2 2 6
The fact that the "gravity" of a crime and the "harshness" of the penalty will be
interpreted differently by different people, in different areas of the country is not a
new concept.2 27 Indeed, it was variability in assessing the severity of crimes that
led to the enactment of the federal sentencing guidelines.22 8
Subjectivity is also a concern for utilitarian-based proportionality reviews of
prison conditions. This raises the same basis for criticism as the current "objective"
prong (as discussed in Part II), in that the view of what is acceptable or illegal is
largely based on the personal opinion of the jurist. Part IV discusses why, even
with these subjectivity issues, a balancing approach would still improve unifor-
mity and transparency of conditions of confinement decisions.
2. Narrowness
Proportionality reviews have also been criticized for provoking insufficient
judicial intervention. While courts have struck down some punishments, particu-
larly in the area of excessive fines 229 and death penalty eligibility,230 they have
been hesitant to intervene in many other areas. Advocates and scholars have
particularly criticized the courts' limited willingness to intervene in overturning
criminal prison sentences. 2 3 1 Alex Reinert attributes this reluctance to separation
of powers concerns, stating deference is "essential to ceding to the legislature, as a
majoritarian institution, the primary responsibility of judging the seriousness of
"objective" criteria of state legislation and arguing that their use is illogical or junk science); Karlan, supra note
189, at 886-88.
223. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2037 (2010); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977).
224. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2038; Solem, 463 U.S. at 305.
225. Thomas, supra note 221, at 87.
226. Karlan, supra note 189, at 893.
227. For example, sentences in the United States are typically two to three times the length of the sentences
assigned in Europe for the same crimes. THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 15, at 113.
228. See generally Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the
Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 19, 36-37 (2003).
229. Frase, supra note 150, at 51-53.
230. Id. at 54-57.
231. Id. at 57-58 (calling the Court's holdings "disappointing" and noting it is "well known" that "the Court
has been very reluctant to invalidate lengthy prison terms on Eighth Amendment grounds"); Reinert, supra note 9,
at 71.
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particular crimes" and "legislatures should be given as much leeway to punish
particular crimes as they are given to define them." 2 32
Critics worry courts will only use proportionality review to invalidate the most
egregious prison conditions. This concern is valid because courts often defer to
prison officials in cases challenging prison conditions, so they may be overly
hesitant and narrow in analyzing proportionality. However, there are also reasons
why proportionality review would be easier to manage in the conditions setting.
First, in other Eight Amendment contexts, courts often lack accurate information
about the purpose of a punishment. For example, in reviewing legislative deci-
sions, such as fines, sentences, and death penalty eligibility, courts must often infer
the goals of statutory penalties because it is difficult to obtain reliable testimony.233
Without clear information on the intended purpose, some courts ascribe legislative
justifications that may not be accurate. However, in prison conditions cases, this
information is more readily obtainable.23 4 Testimony and evidence is regularly
presented in these cases regarding the interest and rationale underlying certain
conditions or treatment.23 5 The next Part discusses why proportionality review
would also increase transparency in court decisions.
IV. A NEw APPROACH: BALANCING IN PRISON CONDITION CASES
Despite its criticisms, proportionality review would improve the uniformity and
transparency of decisions in conditions of confinement cases. This Part proposes a
modified version of the two-prong test for conditions of confinement challenges
that integrates proportionality balancing. Under the adjusted test, the objective
prong would still assess whether a condition is sufficiently serious to merit
constitutional protection. However, it would eliminate the "basic human needs"
requirement and require a utilitarian-based proportionality assessment of the
challenged condition where the court would weigh the harm of the condition
against any alleged purpose. Additionally, the subjective prong would be inferable
in injunctive cases. Allowing the court to infer subjective intent would better
address societal interests in ongoing conditions cases, while still accurately
evaluating cases seeking money damages for past action. In short, it would allow
courts to protect prisoners from current harmful or potentially dangerous condi-
tions and protect past actors from liability if they lacked the requisite intent.
This altered test would better balance the competing interests of protecting
232. Reinert, supra note 9, at 71.
233. Ristroph, supra note 140, at 1363-67; see also John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation
in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1212-17 (1970) (discussing the difficulty with discerning legislative
motivation and problems with using motivation to invalidate otherwise valid laws).
234. See generally James D. Nelson, Note, Incarceration, Accommodation, and Strict Scrutiny, 95 VA. L. REv.
2053 (2009) (discussing evidence presented by prison officials in challenges to conditions limiting religious
practice).
235. See id.
2012] 1847
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
prisoners from future harm and ensuring officers are not unfairly liable for simple
errors or misjudgments. The changes also provide increased transparency in court
decision-making and better unify conditions of confinement doctrine with other
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Since the proposed test retains the objective
and subjective prongs, judges and lawyers can immediately implement it.
A. A New Objective Prong
Under the new objective prong, the operative question in the balancing analysis
would be whether the harm from the challenged condition is proportional to the
penological interest in its use. It effectively eliminates the "basic human needs"
requirement as ambiguous and unhelpful to courts and imposes a utilitarian review
where the court weighs the reason for instituting a particular condition against the
harm it inflicts on prisoners.
For example, preventing suicides is a necessary and important goal in prisons.
One potential response to this concern is to keep everyone who is incarcerated on
constant suicide watch.23 6 However, while such a policy would undoubtedly
decrease suicides, prisons would understandably hesitate to enact it, as prisoners
on suicide watch require constant monitoring at a large cost to the prison. The
prisoner's quality of life also decreases, as he must reside in austere conditions,
without possessions and clothing. Under a utilitarian proportionality analysis,
placing all prisoners on permanent suicide watch would be disproportionate to the
problem it sought to address, and would raise a sufficiently serious condition,
meriting court intervention under the objective prong.
1. Benefits of the Modified Objective Prong
This modified objective prong improves conditions of confinement decision-
making in two important ways. First, it harmonizes conditions of confinement
cases with other areas of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, including sentencing
and excessive force. Second, it provides better guidance to judicial decision-
making, facilitating more explicit analysis in judicial opinions. Each benefit is
discussed in turn.
Harmonizing Eighth Amendment doctrine is more important than it seems.
Absent alignment of the guiding principles, courts are effectively talking out of
both sides of their mouths, denying similarities between certain areas of law while
borrowing principles and language from others without acknowledging their
differences.2 37 For example, the Supreme Court has maintained "death is differ-
236. For a description of conditions on suicide watch, see Daniel Engber, What Happens on Suicide Watch?,
SLATE (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/explainer/2005/12/what
happens-on-suicide-watch.html.
237. Rachel A. Van Cleave, "Death is Different, " Is Money Different? Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and
Punitive Damages--Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J.
217, 230 (2003) (discussing confusion related to method for determining punishment). The Court itself has
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ent" and justifies a different degree of review in death penalty cases,23 8 but has
directly relied on capital punishment reasoning in other Eighth Amendment
venues, such as prison sentences.2 39 Without agreement on the basic principles that
underlie these diverse challenges, the amalgamation is confusing and often
disingenuous. 2 4 0 Harmonization would strengthen the Eighth Amendment's theo-
retical basis as based in a prohibition on excessiveness and help the courts identify
guiding principles.
Utilitarian proportionality review would also increase transparency. Many
scholars have espoused the benefit of simply having courts "show their work." 2 4 1
In the qualified immunity context, Sam Kamin explains that increased transpar-
ency guides subsequent court decisions, reduces litigation by creating concrete
rules, and prevents errors.2 42 Justice Breyer has also espoused the importance of
including all considerations in an opinion, explaining that he would include all
"helpful" sources because "transparency is important in an opinion." 243 Without
these disclosures, courts may also dismiss a similar case in the future.
In the conditions context, explicit balancing would require courts to provide
clear rationales for why they allow or forbid certain conditions. As discussed in
Part II, it is likely that many judges consider the purpose of a condition when
evaluating its seriousness. However, they rarely include this thought process in
their opinions given the structure of the current test.2 " Encouraging courts to
explicitly weigh these factors provides notice to other judges, prisoners, and prison
officials about the concerns or judgments that underlie the decisions. This
increases transparency and uniformity between rulings.
For example, suppose our hypothetical Mr. Jones is serving thirty years of
solitary confinement for killing a correctional officer and is thought to be
extremely dangerous. Mr. Jones alleges psychological and physical harm as a
result of his isolation, but evidence of such harm is contested. The judge is
concerned about the effects of three decades of solitary confinement, but believes
acknowledged that its "precedents in [the area of the Eighth Amendment] have not been a model of
clarity .... [and] have not established a clear or consistent path for courts to follow." Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).
238. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) ("Proportionality review is one of several respects in
which we have held that 'death is different,' and have imposed protections that the Constitution nowhere else
provides.").
239. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010) (relying on reasoning in Atkins, a death penalty
case, to rule a non-death sentence unconstitutional); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 83 (2008) (relying on reasoning in
Atkins to justify reasoning as to whether method of execution was acceptable).
240. Van Cleave, supra note 237, at 230-31 (arguing for uniformity among Eighth Amendment doctrines).
241. See generally Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil Rights
Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 53 (2008).
242. Id. at 59-61.
243. Justice Antonin Scalia & Justice Stephen Breyer, A Conversation on the Relevance of Foreign Law for
American Constitutional Adjudication, U.S. Assoc. OF CONsT. L. DiscussioN (Jan. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1352357/posts.
244. See supra Part I.A.
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the prison officials were justified in continuing to isolate Mr. Jones because of
security risks. Under the traditional test, the judge may worry that if he finds Mr.
Jones's prolonged isolation "sufficiently serious" under the objective prong, the
decision will go to the jury who will then find culpable intent and hold the officials
liable.24 5 The judge therefore rules the three decades of solitary confinement were
not "sufficiently serious" in order to satisfy the objective prong and end the case.
The opinion effectively sanctions solitary confinement by holding it is not a
troubling or serious practice.
In contrast, a decision employing utilitarian review would provide a richer
discussion on the issues raised in the case, even if the outcome is the same. The
judge could explicitly discuss his concerns with thirty years of solitary confine-
ment and state Mr. Jones was harmed by this treatment. He could also voice his
concerns that Mr. Jones remains a safety risk to general population and look into
less harmful alternatives that would reduce Mr. Jones's isolation but still achieve
security goals. Even if the judge still found the isolation was acceptable under the
Eighth Amendment, the opinion would provide more guidance for future courts.
Rather than give blanket acceptance to the use of long-term solitary confinement,
the court's decision would provide notice to prison officials that prolonged
isolation is a concerning and harmful practice, only permissible for such a lengthy
period of time when the interest is specific and compelling.
The new objective prong helps harmonize Eight Amendment jurisprudence,
increases transparency in conditions of confinement cases, and yields more clearly
reasoned opinions. All these benefits are not attainable under the traditional test.
However, once the balancing approach is adopted, the primary challenge becomes
deciding who should bear the burden of proof and how to weigh the different
interests.
2. Sharing the Burden of Proof
In designing the new balancing test, it is important to remember the critical role
of the judiciary in providing a check on the prisons. While courts may not be the
best monitors of prison systems, in many cases the judiciary is the only vehicle for
prisoners to seek redress for infringements of their rights. Other sources for
oversight of the prisons, including ombudsmen, legislative audits, community
organizing, and the media, suffer from funding problems, political pressures, and
245. See McMillian v. Johnson, 101 F.3d 1363, 1368-69 (1lth Cir. 1996) ("I find it difficult to see how
[subjective intent] can be determined at the summary judgment stage if there is any substantial evidence of an
illegal motive in view of the established law which precludes a trial court's making credibility determinations,
weighing the evidence, and interfering with ajury's drawing of legitimate inferences from the evidence."); Croley
v. Matson Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970); see generally Brian Saccenti, Comment, Preventing
Summary Judgment Against Inmates Who Have Been Sexually Assaulted by Showing that the Risk Was Obvious,
59 MD. L. REV. 642, 662-63 (2000) (noting courts' recognition that there should be caution before granting
summary judgment where a party's state of mind is at issue.).
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the lack of available information.24 6 Federal judges are in a better position to
provide a check on government power in prisons because they are not elected, can
command prison staff to produce information, order state action, and hold parties
in contempt for non-compliance.24 7 Keeping this in mind, a balancing test must
first determine whether prisoners or prison officials are entitled to a presumption of
correctness. After reviewing the options, this article concludes that, under the new
objective prong, the prisoner should bear the initial burden of demonstrating harm
and then the court should evenly weigh the interests of both parties against one
another.
There are numerous ways to approach the burden of proof under the new
objective prong. One option is to require prison officials to justify every chal-
lenged condition.24 8 However, the government generally bears such a heavy
burden only where it is "highly predictable that illegitimate motives are at
work,"24 9 a prerequisite many would hesitate to ascribe to prison administrators.2 50
Despite this general hesitation, there are some conditions, such as deprivations of
food, clothing, and safety, which are so basic that their denial requires govern-
ment justification. Yet, even these conditions cannot be separated from the general
balancing test. For instance, the determination of what fits into this "special class"
of deprivations would complicate the already problematic debate about what
conditions are sufficiently serious. Placing the burden of proof on prison officials
to justify every condition of confinement, regardless of its impact, might also
prompt courts to hesitate before ruling a condition sufficiently serious. Thus, a
heightened review of prison conditions, established with the goal of better
protecting prisoners, might actually impede progress. Rather than establishing
liability for bad prison conditions, such scrutiny might prevent a broad interpreta-
246. See generally Michele Deitch, Independent Correctional Oversight Mechanisms Across the United
States: A 50-State Inventory, 30 PACE L. REV. 1754, 1762 (2010) (reviewing monitoring mechanisms in every state
and concluding while there are many monitoring organizations "it should be clear. .. that formal and comprehen-
sive external oversight-in the form of inspections and routine monitoring of conditions that affect the rights of
prisoners-is truly rare in this country. Even more elusive are forms of oversight that seek to promote both public
transparency of correctional institutions and accountability for the protection of human rights").
247. See generally Harold Baer, Jr. & Arminda Bepko, A Necessary and Proper Role for Federal Courts in
Prison Reform: The Benjamin v. Malcolm Consent Decrees, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 3 (2007-08) (arguing for
federal courts' involvement in monitoring prisons).
248. Cass R. Sunstein, Forward: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REV. 4, 78 (1996).
249. Id. Only two rights in the prisons have been deemed to require this heightened protection: the right to be
free from racial discrimination and the right to be free from infringement upon religious practice. See Johnson v.
California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (applying strict scrutiny to policies related to race); Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at
Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA 's Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUs. Pot'Y
501, 539-45 (2005) (discussing strict scrutiny standard in religious rights context).
250. "Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would
seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration," Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), thereby "unnecessarily...
perpetuat[ing] the involvement of the federal courts in affairs of prison administration." Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 407 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989).
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tion of what qualifies for Eighth Amendment protection251' and eliminate liability
for some conditions.
At the other end of the spectrum, courts could simply presume prison officials
are correct by using rational basis review. This approach is common in the prison
context, as challenges outside the Eighth Amendment are reviewed under the
rational basis framework dictated in Turner v. Safley.25 2 Under Turner, a prison
regulation or practice that impinges on a prisoner's constitutional rights is only
valid if it reasonably relates to a legitimate penological interest.253 While it is
possible Turner could be extended to Eighth Amendment claims, the Supreme
Court has explicitly rejected rational basis review for these challenges.25 4 The
Justices explained that limiting the Eighth Amendment would thwart its purpose of
protecting those who are incarcerated.2 5 5 Citing the Ninth Circuit, the Court held,
"[T]he full protections of the [E]ighth [A]mendment most certainly remain in
force [in prison]. The whole point of the [A]mendment is to protect persons
convicted of crimes."25 6 Accordingly, the Court explained, "deference to the
findings of state prison officials in the context of the [E]ighth [A]mendment would
reduce that provision to a nullity in precisely the context where it is most
necessary."2 57
Rather than giving either the prisoner or the prison officials a presumption of
correctness in the proportionality analysis of the objective prong, courts should
evenly balance the interests of the government and the prisoner. The burden
would neither be on the government to justify use of the condition nor on the
prisoner to demonstrate that the condition is illegitimate. Once the prisoner shows
some greater than de minimis degree of harm,258 neither side would presumptively
prevail, as the court would be empowered to weigh both sides' interests. Using
such an evaluation would require both sides to be explicit about their justifications
or concerns and to provide evidence of the same. Even if the outcome of cases did
not change under such a balancing test, a main benefit of this approach would be
increased transparency on the reasons for governmental actions, allowing judges a
251. The hesitation to find "new" areas covered under the Eighth Amendment is discussed generally supra Part
II. In addition, this is illustrated by some courts explicitly stating they should only intervene in the face of "clearly
demonstrated" constitutional violations. See, e.g., Burks v. Teasdale, 492 F. Supp. 650, 655 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
252. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
253. Id.
254. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511 (2005) (finding that giving only rational basis review to
claims brought under the Eighth Amendment thwarts its purpose).
255. Id. ("[Tihe integrity of the criminal justice system depends on full compliance with the Eighth
Amendment.").
256. Id. (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979)).
257. Id. (quoting Spain, 600 F.2d at 193-94).
258. The de minimis standard-requiring that a harm be more than de minimis for a lawsuit to proceed-
currently exists in Eighth Amendment law. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992). Some
commentators have criticized this requirement, claiming it eliminates harms that should be actionable. Reinert,
supra note 9, at 74-75.
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greater ability to evaluate the assertions.
This procedure is similar to the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti balancing test for
First Amendment cases involving speech by a public employee. In those cases, the
Supreme Court has recognized individual interests in speaking freely and provid-
ing information to the public, as well as a governmental interest in achieving
agency goals efficiently and effectively. 259 Under Pickering/Connick/Garcetti, the
employee has an initial burden to demonstrate that her speech was not part of her
official capacity and that it addressed a matter of public concern.2 60 If she fulfills
this burden, then the judge must weigh the interests of the two sides to determine
whether the speech should be protected. 26 1 The court considers relevant factors on
each side, including the significance of the matter of public concern and the
disruptive nature of the employee's speech to the functioning of the governmental
office.2 62
Weighing both sides' interests is also used in other Eighth Amendment doc-
trines. For example, when an individual is punitively assessed a fine, the court
weighs the amount of the forfeiture against the gravity of the crime.2 63 The Court
has invalidated fines as disproportionate when the governmental benefit, mostly
retribution and deterrence, was served by assessing a lower amount.264 Expanding
such balancing to conditions of confinement cases is not only feasible, but better
reflects the method used by society in assessing the fairness of punishments.
3. How to Weigh the Interests
Balancing tests vary as to how to weigh the competing interests. Under the new
objective prong, the prisoner must present evidence of harm that is more than
de minimis or demonstrate there exists a risk of harm from the challenged
condition. If the prisoner fails to demonstrate any harm or risk, the objective prong
is not satisfied. If the prisoner can demonstrate a minimum threshold had been
reached, the court then should consider all evidence relating to the challenged
condition. The evidence presented by the prisoner would not differ significantly
from what prisoner-plaintiffs currently use under the objective prong. It could
include prisoner or expert testimony about the harm, as well as other research on
the effects of the condition. The prisoner could rebut any claim of necessity by
259. Monique Alexandra Bair, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Swapping the First Amendment Rights of Public
Employees for Greater Governmental Control, 37 RUTGERS L. REc. 44, 46-47 (2010).
260. Garcetti v. Cebellos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1983); Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-72 (1968).
261. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149.
262. Id. at 149, 152; Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386-89 (1987).
263. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). In Bajakajian, a person was charged over
$300,000 for failing to report leaving the country with a large sum of currency. Id. In looking at a fine assessed as
a punishment, the Supreme Court specifically weighed the harm caused by the loss to the individual against any
benefit to the government Id. at 336-39.
264. Id. at 337-40.
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showing there is a less onerous alternative to achieve the desired objective. Courts
are accustomed to hearing this type of evidence, as one Turner rational basis factor
is whether there are inexpensive, less-restrictive alternatives to an infringing
policy. 265
To counter the alleged harm, prison officials would present evidence of their
reasons for the condition. In some cases, this evidence is presented through
correctional official or expert testimony. Evidence may include general evidence
for a policy or evidence specific to an individual prisoner. Prison officials can also
present evidence that the condition is commonly used by other prison systems to
bolster their case or evidence rebutting the prisoner's claims of harm or risk.
The evidence would enable courts to compare the merits and degree of each
side's interest. In situations where the harm is insignificant or minimal, such as a
prisoner alleging his food upsets his stomach, the prisoner's interest would be
judged as low and prison officials would require little explanation to overcome the
challenge to the condition. Yet, in situations where the condition is more serious,
such as denial of outdoor exercise, the prisoner's interest is much greater and
prison officials must present heightened justifications and evidence of why the
condition was necessary. In these circumstances, courts may consider the financial
or administrative burdens of correcting the condition, such as inconvenience or
staffing costs, but these considerations should only overcome a prisoner's interest
when the financial or administrative burden is significant. 266 For example, adding
outdoor exercise areas would present material, design, and labor costs but they are
likely to be relatively minimal. On the other hand, if a prisoner presented a specific
security risk, such as previously attempting an attack on the way to his outdoor
exercise, then this alone might be a sufficient justification.
One issue with the new objective prong is that not all challenged conditions
stem from intentional actions of prison officials. In cases challenging discrete or
one-time actions, officials may not have had a valid penological interest in a
condition. For example, in some damages cases, a prison official's actions might
result from mistake, misunderstanding, or malicious action.
Although the absence of any legitimate purpose for a condition could make the
objective determination easier, it does not necessarily fulfill the Eighth Amend-
ment intent requirement. If the prison official has no evidence to counter a harmful
condition, courts can easily evaluate whether the condition is sufficiently serious.
However, this lack of interest does not mean the individual had the requisite intent
for Eighth Amendment liability. The prisoner must still demonstrate the officials
acted with deliberate indifference under the subjective prong. For example, if a
prisoner asserted he was injured as a result of unsafe, exposed wiring, it is hard to
265. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987) ("[Tlhe existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be
evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an 'exaggerated response' to prison concerns.").
266. Gaubatz, supra note 249, at 547-48 & n.207 (noting in context of RLUIPA, costs may be considered, but
will only be sufficient in limited situations and not when the cost of change or alternative is de minimis).
1854 [Vol. 49:1815
NECESSARY SUFFERING
imagine the prison officials asserting they had an interest in exposed wires.
However, the prisoner would still need to demonstrate the prison officials acted
with deliberate indifference-that they were aware of the exposed wiring and did
not respond reasonably-before they will be held liable.
While prison officials usually assert a penological interest for injunctive claims,
there are many important instances where they do not. For example, denial of
medical care, which is among the most common claims raised by prisoners, is
rarely, if ever, based on a legitimate penological interest.2 67 Instead, typically, the
objective inquiry is focused on whether the prisoner can meet his initial burden to
demonstrate harm. Prison officials can rebut claims of harm by providing evidence
that the ongoing treatment was reasonable and met the standard of care. For
example, if the prisoner claimed to have ongoing back pain that required surgery,
prison officials could rebut the evidence of harm by showing that he was not
denied care and had received treatment as required by medical standards. How-
ever, as discussed in subpart four, a prison official could still escape liability by
showing he or she did not have the culpable mindset of deliberate indifference.
4. Concerns with Using a Balancing Test
Despite the potential benefits of integrating proportionality review into the
objective prong, two concerns arise immediately: (1) the fear that courts will
micromanage the prisons, and (2) the possibility that a balancing test would still
allow judges the leeway to color decisions regarding serious conditions in the light
of their personal proclivities. The case law of prisoners' rights is replete with
judges expressing discomfort at reviewing the daily management and decisions of
prison officials.2 68 Judges think they lack correctional judgment and often believe
it is appropriate to defer to the expertise of prison staff.2 6 9 Yet this concern is a red
herring. Despite the courts' discomfort, they are already regularly making many
similarly demanding decisions, even in the context of other prisoners' rights
claims.2 7 0 For example, in cases challenging the denial of group worship, raised
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), courts
will consider evidence of the prison's alleged financial and security concerns, as
well as information about what practices are permitted for other religions, before
267. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
268. Turner states "the problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point,
they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree." 482 U.S. at 84 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
According to the Court, "[slubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny
analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to
the intractable problems of prison administration." Id. at 89.
269. Id. at 90.
270. See Gaubatz, supra note 249, at 562.
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concluding whether a religious infringement is permissible.2 7 1
Another criticism of proportionality review is that it is overly subjective.272
Indeed, this very criticism was leveled against the current two-prong test earlier in
this article. 2 73 The criticism is apt. Just as decisions concerning what is "objec-
tively" bad are subject to a judge's own background and experience, so is the
judge's weighing of prison official and prisoner interests. For this reason, it is
likely the outcome of any Eighth Amendment conditions decision employing a
proportionality framework would be the same as under the current test.
Notably, the purpose of the proposed balancing test is not to change the outcome
of conditions cases, but to empower a more intellectually honest review of these
complicated situations and require judges to discuss their reasoning. The develop-
ment of Eighth Amendment doctrine would be much improved if, for instance, the
hypothetical judge reviewing the solitary confinement case of Mr. Jones had
discussed the potential risks associated with solitary confinement, while still
having the latitude to find those risks outweighed by the prison official's specific
security interest. The increased transparency afforded by a balancing test is its own
end. Future courts faced with a challenge to solitary confinement would be better
served by having more thoughtful and robust opinions to guide them.
Courts could also mitigate arbitrariness concerns by using objective factors. In
the sentencing context, judges consider empirical evidence including sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction and sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.2 7 4 While factors from other
doctrines cannot be substituted verbatim into the conditions analysis, in part
because of the lack of legislation concerning prison conditions and the lack of
concrete information about actual conditions, the concept is instructive. Courts
analyzing conditions cases could employ similar factors, including: (1) the
reasonableness of the prison's response as judged by whether other prisons
respond similarly; (2) any national or international information on public opinion
concerning the condition at issue; and (3) evidence that the prison's interest could
be furthered in a less restrictive or painful manner. Of course these factors are only
a starting point. Courts would need to establish additional factors in the process of
determining what evidence is instructive and available.
While not fully resolving the concern about subjectivity, the establishment of
factors would, at a minimum, help to structure a framework for judicial inquiry.
These factors would also be instructive to prisoners and prison officials in
determining what conditions are acceptable. If a particular prison knows the
271. Id.; see also Sarah E. Vallely, Comment, Criminals Are All the Same: Why Courts Need to Hold Prison
Officials Accountable for Religious Discrimination Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act, 30 HAMLINE L. REv. 191, 225-29 (2007).
272. Supra Part III.B. I.
273. See supra Part II.A.
274. See supra Part III.B.1
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practice it employs is unusually harsh, or there is a national consensus against the
condition,2 75 it would be on notice that a challenge to the condition would be more
likely to succeed.
B. A Modified Subjective Prong
In addition to altering the objective prong of the conditions of confinement test,
this Article also argues for a modification to the subjective prong. As discussed
below, questioning of the subjective prong is not novel, and some commentators
urge that it should be removed entirely. This Article takes a more moderate view,
arguing that in cases of ongoing harm courts should establish a rebuttable
presumption that prison officials possess a culpable mindset.
1. Removal of the Subjective Prong
The basic theory underlying the subjective prong is that intent is required for
conduct to be "punishment" under the Eighth Amendment.2 7 6 Courts and scholars
have been hesitant to find harm caused by mistake is actionable "punishment"
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. While some theorists criticize this
requirement,277 courts now universally use the intent prerequisite in prison
conditions cases.27 8
Despite its universal application, there is uncertainty as to what "intent" means.
The Supreme Court compared the deliberate indifference requirement to criminal
recklessness. 27 9 The test is not one of strict liability; a person lacks necessary
intent if heractions were the result of lack of knowledge, mistake, or accident.8
Rather, the Supreme Court requires subjective knowledge of risk of harm for
prison officials to be liable under the Eighth Amendment. 2 8 ' Although the official
must be aware of the risk of harm resulting from the condition, if the risk is
seemingly obvious then the fact-finder can infer awareness.2 82
The deliberate indifference standard is also a high threshold.2 83 For cases
alleging risk of harm, prison officials must have known the challenged condition
presented excessive risk of serious harm. Given how difficult it is to objectively
define merely "substantial risk of serious harm," the subjective requirement is
275. One potential criticism of this approach is that it could result in lowering prison conditions to the "lowest
common denominator;" meaning if many prisons use a harsh condition, it would become acceptable.
276. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 9, at 945.
277. See supra Part I.B.
278. Dolovich, supra note 9, at 897-98; see generally Kolber, supra note 13.
279. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-40 (1994).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 839-40.
282. Id. at 840-41.
283. Kevin R. Corlew, Congress Attempts to Shine a Light on a Dark Problem: An In-Depth Look at the Prison
Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 157, 175 (2006).
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almost prohibitively ambiguous 2 84 and many commentators have questioned
the ability of prisoners to present satisfactory evidence of mindset, even in the face
of an objectively established risk.28 5 For example, in Riccardo v. Rausch, a jury
found the requisite mindset and held an officer liable under the Eighth Amend-
ment.28 6 An en banc panel reversed the jury decision, finding the jury's con-
clusions about the guard's knowledge to be inadequate as a matter of law. 287 In
that instance, even the prisoner telling an officer he was in peril from his cellmate
and subsequently being attacked by that cellmate was inadequate to prove
knowledge.
This standard is so onerous that the federal government has statutorily mandated
any failure to follow its legal requirements preventing prisoner rape will amount to
deliberate indifference.2 89 Specifically, Congress wrote a definition of deliberate
indifference into the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), stating "States that do
not take basic steps to abate prison rape by adopting standards ... demonstrate
such indifference [as defined by Farmer]."2 90 The fact that Congress would put
such a requirement in place is notable. Even more notable is that some courts still
find a prison's failure to comply with PREA inadequate to demonstrate deliberate
indifference under the Eighth Amendment.29 1
The deliberate indifference standard effectively rewards officials for remaining
ignorant of their institutions' affairs.2 92 For this reason, some commentators urge
293elimination or de-emphasis of the intent factor in the prison context. Sharon
Dolovich argues a State assumes the burden for a prisoner's care when it assumes
custody of an individual.294 With this burden in mind, she would eliminate or
lessen the intent requirement and hold prison officials responsible whenever harm
was foreseeable.29 5 While there is room for disagreement about this "negligence"
284. See supra Part H.A. 1.
285. See Corlew, supra note 283, at 175; see also Olga Giller, Notes and Comments, Patriarchy on Lockdown:
Deliberate Indifference and Male Prison Rape, 10 CARDOzO WOMEN's L.J. 659, 676-87 (2004) (analyzing post
Farmer cases and questioning whether prisoners can really win under the "deliberate indifference" standard);
Julie Samia Mair et al., New Hope for Victims of Prison Sexual Assault, 31 J. L. MED. & ETHIcs 602, 603-04
(2003) (discussing the legal environment surrounding prisoner rape); Will A. Smith, Comment, Civil Liability for
Sexual Assault in Prison: A Challenge to the "Deliberate Indifference" Standard, 34 CUMB. L. REv. 289, 299-301
(2004) (detailing the current "deliberate indifference" standard).
286. Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 526-28 (7th Cir. 2004).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 15601(13) (2006).
290. Id.
291. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Cnty. of Hennepin, Minn., No. 06-3625, 2009 WL 3202376, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 30,
2009).
292. This concern was raised in the Farmer case discussing the deliberate indifference standard, but was
summarily dismissed. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842-43 (1994).
293. Dolovich, supra note 9, at 943-46.
294. Id. at 891-93 (arguing the state assumes a "carceral burden" when it imprisons individuals and this
requires it to investigate and eradicate harmful conditions).
295. Id. at 964-66.
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approach to Eighth Amendment conditions cases, there is little debate that this
change would provide additional incentives to protect prisoners.
Although a more objective standard would increase court efficiency and
encourage official awareness of potential risks resulting from prison conditions,
these interests are in tension with the plain language of the Amendment's text,
which compels "punishment" and requires subjective intent. The Supreme Court
could alter its standard and infer the failure to know what a reasonable person
should have known, the standard of negligence, is a form of willful ignorance. Yet,
this would require an overturning of Farmer where the majority rejected that exact
suggestion.296 It would also require a more radical alteration than necessary.
Instead, this Article argues for a more narrowly drawn adjustment that addresses
some onerous areas of deliberate indifference but works within the current
criminal recklessness requirement.
2. Inferring Intent in Injunctive Cases
In the modified subjective prong, courts would presume a culpable mindset of
prison officials in injunctive cases. As discussed in Part II, the intent requirement
loses meaning in cases involving an ongoing harm. The truly "subjective" portion
of the deliberate indifference inquiry, the knowledge portion, is always satisfied, if
only by the lawsuit itself.2 9 7 Thus, the main inquiry turns on the "reasonableness"
of the prison officials' response.2 98 Society has an interest in treating prisoners
humanely. After finding an ongoing harm, courts are generally uncomfortable with
not taking action to improve it.2 9 9 In injunctive cases, prisoners continue to suffer
the challenged conditions, and if they are painful or unnecessary, we want judges
to have a broad ability to fix them. Injunctive cases prevent future harm to
prisoners and enhance the prison officials' understanding as to what conditions are
acceptable.
The strength of the court's interest in addressing an ongoing harm is apparent
when it is juxtaposed with the court's interest in addressing an alleged past harm.
Although society may want to compensate prisoners for their harm, officials are
only liable when they display a culpable mindset." The harmful action, when
isolated from the mindset that motivated it, does not demonstrate culpability
because the act may have been intentional or may have resulted from an isolated
296. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-40.
297. See John Boston, David C. Fathi & Elizabeth Alexander, Farmer v. Brennan: Defining Deliberate
Indifference Under the Eighth Amendment, 14 ST. Louis U. Pua. L. REv. 83, 101-02 (1994) (noting grievances or
expert testimony might demonstrate knowledge).
298. See supra Part II.B.1.
299. See supra Part II.B. 1.
300. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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mistake.30 ' Although past cases may still provide notice by clarifying the standards
of acceptable conduct, ensuring compensation for prior harm is of secondary
importance.
Based on these interests, intent should be inferable in any injunctive action.
When prison officials are sued in an injunctive case, they have notice of the
challenged action and the alleged harm or risk resulting from it. There can be no
question they know of the disputed practice. At any point, they could alter or
discontinue the practice and many do, as mooting prison conditions cases is com-
mon. 30 2 Thus, a culpable mindset can be inferred by the continuance of a particular
challenged action.303
Authorizing different treatment for injunctive and damages suits is not a novel
concept. In several government contexts, plaintiffs can obtain future equitable re-
lief, but past monetary recovery is subject to limitations or defenses. 30 For
example, qualified immunity protects officers only from money damages, but does
not preclude them from following a court order. The differential treatment results
from a court preference towards equity, which is a less intrusive means for
plaintiffs to validate their rights than damages and allows courts to establish clear
legal boundaries. 3 0 5 Allowing this differential treatment in Eighth Amendment
conditions cases would serve similar interests, as it allows the court to prevent
future violations without finding individual fault. 3 0 6
CONCLUSION
The current two-prong test for Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
cases is broken. The test should be a helpful means of investigating the legality of
prison conditions, but instead it is a source of dissonant standards and tangled
reasoning. Although distinguishing between acceptable and unconstitutional prison
conditions is challenging, the current application of the two-prong conditions of
confinement test is arbitrary and fails to account for the factor of penological
interest, prompting inconsistent holdings, and offering little guidance to judges,
prison officials, or advocates in the field.
By modifying the two-prong test, I aim to preserve the traditional interests of the
court while establishing a more natural and efficient analytical process. This
301. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
303. This inference of intent would be similar to what is allowed in discrimination cases. See, e.g., Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (finding prima facie case and sufficient evidence of
pretext may permit trier of fact to infer unlawful discrimination).
304. Alex Reinert, Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights Litigation and the Illusory Promise of Equity,
78 UMKC L. REV. 931,932 (2010).
305. See id. at 936-43 (summarizing literature).
306. Id. at 941-43 (discussing John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Lw, 109 YALE
L.J. 87 (1999)).
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modified test urges an integration of proportionality review into the objective
prong, transforming the court's unspoken balancing of interests into an explicit and
transparent feature of the court's analysis. I also suggest a modification of the
subjective prong in injunctive cases, endorsing the inference of a culpable mindset
from a persistent inaction. While modest in scope, these adjustments would
produce a more robust, nuanced, and honest consideration of the numerous Eighth
Amendment claims confronting judges on a daily basis.
